DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN ON COMMUNAL RIOTS

STATE

SUBMITTED TO

UP ACADEMY OF ADMINISTRATION & MANAGEMENT

DRAFT

INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT GROUP

B-1/19, Vivek Khand, Lucknow 226 010

Preface

State Disaster Management Plan for Communal Riots has been developed on the basis of the secondary sources notably reports, recommendations, and guidelines as mentioned below:

  National Integration Council Guidelines

  Raghubar Dayal Commission

  Prasad Commission

  Jaganmohan Reddy Commission

  D. P. Madon Commission

  NHRC Reports

  National Police Commission Reports and

  Ministry of Home Affairs Guidelines on Communal Riots.
The draft report is, thus, largely conceptual in tenor, content, and approach.
A more focussed and matter-of-fact DMP on Communal Riots is definitely possible. However, to hone up the draft plan into a more grounded document would call for a very specific set of data inputs on various aspects of state government policies on communal harmony; available resource base for riot control and mitigation; intelligence mechanisms for real-time alerts; and the strategies that are in place to prevent the occurrence of riots, and minimize the spread and damage, if they do occur despite the best administrative measures.
In fact, we at IMG started to work on the plan on the assumption that the critical inputs on prevailing riot control mechanisms would be made available to us by the Home Department, Government of Uttar Pradesh. We contacted Sri Vikas Gothalwal, IAS, Special Secretary, Department of Home, Government of Uttar Pradesh, the designated Nodal Officer with a set of questions (Annexure) on the matter. He expressed his inability to share the information with us on the grounds of confidentiality and sensitivity. However, he directed us to meet Sri A.P. Maheshwari, IPS, Inspector General (Law & Order). He too expressed similar constraints in sharing the information and suggested that a brainstorming session should be organized officially

at UPAAM with a group of police officers. We requested UPAAM to this effect, however, they expressed their inability organise such a session. Our quest was brought to a halt on August 4th 2009 by Sri Mahesh Gupta, IAS, Home Secretary, Government of U.P. during the presentation of Disaster Management Plan before the officials of Home department. We were advised in no uncertain terms that the government could not share classified / sensitive data on this subject with the consultants.

It is against this backdrop, that the plan has been developed. We now present the Draft Disaster Management Plan on Communal Riots with a sincere hope that the document will be critically examined and commented upon by the experts committee. The valuable suggestions from experts shall enhance greatly the value and usefulness of the final document.

Executive Summary

The objectives of a Riot DMP would be: to maintain law and order., to provide information on time, to the people about the danger, to shift those at risk to safer places., to ensure arrangement for food, shelter, and medicines for the affected people, to protect vital installations and ensure smooth functioning of essential services, to provide protection to properties belonging to members of public as well as to the government, and to minimize effective response time so that relief and rescue operations are undertaken immediately.

However, details of these activities would form part of the District Riot Plans. At the State level the plan needs to be strategic – it should anticipate the resource requirements and logistic supports needed by the districts in their response actions. State Plan should also aim at preventing the riots, and to this end should explore the reasons behind frequent occurrences of communal riots and what can be done to counter the socio-economic and historical forces that tend to encourage communal violence.

This Plan sets out a roadmap in line with statutory provisions of the Acts, guidelines and executive orders issued by MHA, GoI, and other instructions on the subject by GOI and GoUP. The Plan aims at five strategic goals: 1) Professionalising the disaster management process; 2) Making preparedness, risk reduction / mitigation parts of their normal processes by concerned departments / organizations; 3) Strengthening institutional mechanisms to achieve the highest degree of coordination; 4) Strengthening emergency response systems to ensure that responses are prompt and effective; and 5) Strengthening rehabilitation and recovery structure.

The Plan sets out the following intermediate objectives: Identification of risk reduction / mitigation activities for communal riots; Classification of necessary activities for effective preparedness for different Departments / Organizations; Identifying emergency responses for different stages of communal riots; Situation analysis to understand and identify factors encouraging communal violence and to set in place an institutional mechanisms for curbing such factors; Creating appropriate structure for seamlessly providing relief and humanitarian assistance; Creating system and infrastructure for effective training and

capacity building for risk mitigation, prevention and response; and Creating heightened awareness among the community-members by education and communication activities

What is a communal riot: A riot is “a violent disturbance of the peace by an assembly or body of persons”. It becomes a communal riot if disturbance of peace is caused by distinct community(ies) and is aimed at other distinct community(ies). Usually, in the Indian context a communal riot implies violent behaviour of the two major communities – Hindus and Muslims. A communal riot often flares up with a seemingly insignificant incidence. However, once started, the speed at which the violence spreads suggests that the violent activities were pre-planned. Thus even if the incidence that triggered the violence were spontaneous the subsequent follow up behaviour is rarely so. The cause of riot, then, lies beyond the incidences that trigger it – perhaps in some deep underlying forces that have kept the communal riots alive for centuries.

Agencies involved in managing a communal riot: Police is the primary agency for communal situations. Other agencies that have major role in planning and execution of response operations are intelligence agencies, armed police (PAC) and army. These are support agencies. There are other support agencies viz. Department of Health, Department of Food & Civil Supplies, Directorate of Information & Public Relations, and Department of Revenue (Scarcity).

Why do riots occur: Determining the true cause can be a very involved issue as different causes may surface at different levels of enquiry. It is useful to examine the causality at three levels. The first constitute the incidences that trigger violence, referred to as the primary cause. Such incidences can be spontaneous like teasing a girl of another community or could be planned like playing music in front of a masjid during prayers. Often the motive is sending a message to the opposition community for a local leadership issue, asserting rights over some local resource such as a river ghat, or consolidating own community (in the wake of a communal clash) for an upcoming election and so on. The leadership issue, local resource or the upcoming election manifest the secondary cause. Primary and secondary causes, jointly, can be taken as immediate or proximate causes. The third level of enquiry into why riots occur seeks causality in social structure and historical forces. This would perhaps fall beyond the scope of a DMP. It still needs to understood

by those managing riots as it often provides the perspective to see patterns in sporadic events occurring at distant places at different points in time.

For example, a riot can be seen to arise out of (justified?) majority resentment against a minority’s alleged disloyalty to or betrayal of the country; or a riot can be seen as a consequence of provocation of a harassed minority by militant Hindu nationalists. In both cases the remedial measures will perhaps fall well within the domain of the police, the Primary Agency for managing communal riots.

At this stage, it should be noted that such analysis of underlying causes may give rise to another complexity. If a riot is interpreted as a result of the outrage felt by one community on, say, disloyalty / betrayal revealed by another then this very interpretation would contribute to the failure to prosecute the perpetrators of violence even when their identities are well known.

Theories of Ethnic Violence: There are three major theories to explain presence or absence of ethnic violence in mixed communities are based on a) inter-ethnic associational ties, b) political incentives and c) intra-ethnic self policing. First theory argues that associational ties between Hindus and Muslims prevent communal riots. According to the second theory electoral incentives are the best predictor of whether or not a riot will occur. The third model holds that riots can be prevented through a mechanism in which community leaders punish community members guilty in inter-ethnic disputes.

Hazard Risk Assessment: Risks is product of likely loss in case of the occurrence of the hazardous event and the probability of the occurrence of the event itself. Communal riots cause loss of human lives and destruction of properties. It is not possible to accurately estimate the losses arising from a potential riot at any place. Three indicators provide measures for a rough assessment of likely loss: population density, existence of isolated dwellings – isolated geographically or socially, and existence of properties.

Probability of occurrence of a riot: Studies of past riots have revealed some pointers. There appears a clear correlation between occurrence of a riot and demographic profile, existence of a dispute between two communities, and religious conversion (or re- conversions) at a centre.

Against this backdrop, the Plan has mapped vulnerability risk of the State. The parameters considered are the population size, its demographic profile and the history of communal violence observed over the past few decades. The table in Section 3.4.2 of the Plan, on page 32 shows relative risk hazard assessment.

Extent of damage also depends on the level of violence observed in a riot. Historically riots in Meerut, Moradabad, Varanasi, Kanpur and Aligarh have been very violent. Communal violence at these centres tends to get spilled over at nearby (satellite) centres. This symbiotic linkage between some centres has been shown in a table on page 34 of the report.

Probable causes: Proximate causes for the riots can be broadly classified under four heads: Religious, Personal, Reactive and Ritual. Religious causes include playing of music near a mosque during prayers, both communities claiming ownership of a place of worship, desecration of a place of worship, killing of cows or pigs, etc. Personal causes include molestation of a woman of one community by a member of another community; quarrel between landlord and tenant or between employer and employee of different communities, dispute between neighbours, forcible acquisition of properties by builders etc. A riot can be in reaction to a situation which happens elsewhere in the country; or even in the world hurting the sensibilities of a community. Ritual causes include throwing of gulala etc during Holi and relate to problems associated with taking out religious processions through localities inhabited by other community and raising of slogans on such occasions.

Dynamics of communal riots: A riot may start with any cause. It affects public order. Intra-ethnic communication stops altogether. Motivated parties spread out rumours and public start believing them. Even the sane community leaders who disparage the anti- social elements in normal times grudgingly accept them and even give sanction to their activities. The chaotic situation offers opportunities to petty criminals to indulge in arson and looting. With utter breakdown of public order and wild rumours floating around communities become hysterical and take leave of their senses. Even law abiding citizens may actively take part in looting or at least in sheltering criminals and offering support. Emerging Concerns: Growing urbanization, changes in organized sector employment profiles and the change in the political discourse of the country have impacted the riots

situation. Living in slums produces frustration–aggression syndrome facilitating ethnic violence. Even outside slums, many families occupy one room tenements, with concentration of minority communities in distinct pockets, leading exclusivist tendency among members, creating the potential for communal mobilization. Economic liberalization has seen many employers moving elsewhere for economic incentives. New employment opportunities require a different skill set and the newly unemployed move to the informal sector that thrives on exploitation of workers. These workers are likely to be among the first victims of communal aggression and, also easily susceptible to be drawn into perpetrating communal violence. The political fabric has changed over the decades. Issues like terrorist incursions from Pakistan, and alleged appeasement of Muslims for electoral gains have helped the rise of a militant form of Hindutva. The Muslims feel driven more and more to assert their identity, further contributing to the Hindutva idiom gaining grounds. Political factors often aggravate the cleavages between the ethnic groups.

Failures in handling communal riots: Analysis of the administration’s failure in anticipating riots, and apprehending offenders can be traced to indiscriminate transfers / postings of officers, not always posted on objective considerations; inadequate resources; inadequate training; lack of coordination and a tendency to hide the true facts with long term adverse effects – also adversely affecting the trust of public in government.

Prevention: Prevention is better than cure. Standard precautionary measures and sound intelligence are the two pillars of preventing riots. Riot Scheme or the District Riot Plan is at the heart of riot specific precautionary measures. A riot scheme details the course of action of the police in a riot situation. More importantly it contains various data relating to the area covered by it detailing the historical forces at work and identifying the likely principal actors of both communities. Many a time riot plans are prepared ain routive manner and the administration forfeits the use of the most potent tool for managing riots. A riot scheme must, at least, have:

a. Complete background information of the area covered by it

b. List of bad characters with their addresses and with the names of policemen who will be
able to identify them

c. List of locations where trouble could erupt, in order of their importance

d. More vulnerable localities where minority communities and weaker sections
normally reside in sizeable numbers

e. Maximum and minimum scheme of static deployment of the police.

f. Placement of reserves and the maximum and minimum reserves requirements

g. Information on hospitals, fire brigades, and availability of other civic services

The scheme must be carefully and constantly updated. Item (b) would require particular attention in this regard.

Some precautionary measures: First precautionary measure is regulation of trouble prone areas. Police Stations/Posts should be set up in all sensitive / trouble-prone areas with realistically assessed manpower requirements and provided with trained personnel, adequate weaponry, communication links, vehicles, and equipment for videography. Other precautionary measure is restraining anti-social elements at the slightest hint of trouble. Peace Committees play a useful role in quelling sentiments and the administration should maintain constant touch with peace loving influential members ob both communities. In sensitive areas with a history of communal riots peace committees should be constituted on a permanent basis and the membership of such committees should be constantly reviewed.

Often rumours are set afloat as a preparation for riots. The administration should be alive to rumour mongering and disseminate correct information to the public through all available means. In such disseminations the emphasis should be on concrete steps taken for correcting the situation and not on plaintive demands on the people for cooperation.

Intelligence: Intelligence plays the most crucial role in prevention of communal riots. Police & administration have for long maintained records of various physical data. If updated regularly, a scrutiny of these records, particularly of the fluctuations therein, can reveal a number of pointers. Such records should be properly maintained at the districts and police stations and regularly fed to the State agencies. State level agency should interpret this data on an aggregate basis for the whole State. With such analysis, the advice of the State intelligence agencies to the district units would be more precise and useful and would enable the district administration and police to develop well chalked out plans in advance.

Control Room: A control room can have value in a riot situation only if it functions effectively during normal times. Control room should be manned by polite and competent offices who can assess the information received. If control rooms inspire confidence in

the public mind during normal times then they would receive a mass of valuable information during crisis situations.

Mock drill: Riot schemes should be rehearsed so that those including, the para military forces and the Army, who have to implement them would know their roles during a crisis. These exercises would give an idea of the pattern of mobilisation of forces, which would leave no gaps, and which would leave no community unprotected. They would also reveal the need of drawing alternative routes and sitting of reserves at easily accessible points. Rehearsing the riot schemes needs to be a compulsory annual activity.

Transfer and Posting: Only specially selected experienced officers with an image of impartiality should be posted to the communally sensitive districts. They should not normally be transferred before the completion of their tenure and in any case all district and police officers should not be transferred at the same time.

Hardships caused by curfews: There is no special agency to help citizens in a curfew bound area if they need to go out, for example, to the hospital. Often the procedure for obtaining curfew passes is not known to public. These should be widely publicised through and there should be centres within easy reach of citizens from where these passes can be issued.

Offences during riots- registering, investigations and prosecution: Often victims would rarely risk their lives to go to the police station report a crime during riots. Police, therefore, should open several reporting centres at different points in a riot torn area. The very fact that an aggrieved party is provided a facility to report its grievance would increase its confidence in the rule of law, and will help towards restoring normalcy. Special investigation teams (SIT) should be set up to investigate crimes committed during riots. Such teams should be set up under a State agency and should function under the supervision of a fairly senior officer. Investigations should be conducted competently, quickly and impartially. At present a large number of cases related to crimes reported during riots end in final reports; convicted cases are usually simple cases in which the accused are caught red handed on the spot. Finally, courts often take very long to dispose these cases. Even setting up of special courts for expeditious trials, has not solved the problem. Perhaps some

special provisions in the law and procedure are required in the investigation and prosecution of offences committed during communal riots.

Communal representation in Police: Often police is accused of partiality. Police should be fully representative of the society in which they function and there is a strong case for encouraging the recruitment of members of the minority community and other weaker sections in the police force.

Role of Home Guards: Home Guards are organised with proper command structure, they are local people and can play a useful role during riot situations. However, they need additional training and compensation when pressed into such difficult tasks. In an emergent situation the local authorities should be empowered to requisition the services of Home Guards. Appropriate rules need to be framed for this purpose.

Training: Policemen are overworked and the State is, like the rest of the country rather under-policed. Training of policemen is a big casualty of this state of affairs. For Police to remain an effective force, each policeman should be given at least one week’s refresher course every year in combat practice, weaponry, videography and communication methods. Station level police officers should be given periodic training in preparation of riot schemes, intelligence gathering, force deployment and formation, and weaponry. Sub- division and District level police officers need to go to regular course on preparation of riot schemes, intelligence analysis, force deployment & formation and tactics. All training programmes, at all levels must have a motivational content as well. Even senior police officers need to attend programmes on leadership and crisis management.

As a large number of junior officers of other civil departments are invested with magisterial authority during riots, there should be special programmes for them covering riot control, legal provisions, and powers and duties of a magistrate. Finally, the armed police (PAC) must be trained annually with an entire company in one programme.

Alert mechanism: Warnings come from the intelligence wing or from a police station in whose area some spontaneous act like stabbing that can assume communal overtone. The information must be passed on to the District administration, who in turn would inform

the SCR. Thus the alert mechanism may entail information flow from State to district or from district to State. District will activate the warning phase of its DRP and keep SCR informed. If the situation is not diffused and violence erupts, the SCR will define the level

Districts

Threat to communal harmony discerned by

    

State / Central Intelligence Agencies

   

SCR

District Administration

  Closer regulation of vulnerable localities

  Closer monitoring of anti social
elements’ movements

  Informal meetings with members of
peace committees

  Strengthened, wide spread police
presence

Situation diffused

Violence flares up

 

Level declaration by SDMA

District Intelligence Agencies

Station House Officer

   

L1: Monitor the situation

L2: Activate SDMP

  

L3: Activate SDMP,
Seek central assistance

 

of the disaster keeping in view the report of the intelligence wing and of the violence eruption(s). The chart depicts the flow of information and activities. If the violence can be brought under the control by the district administration, it is an L1 situation. If the scale of violence would warrant intervention from the State level, it would be and L2 situation and in L3 situations Central government’s intervention becomes necessary. In case of L1, SCR will merely monitor the situation. In case of L2/L3 the SDMP will be activated.

Reports of large scale violence will almost always be accompanied with requests from district administration for units of PAC. Such situations, as they require State level interventions should be considered as L2.

Required measures will depend on the level of the situation and have been described under different situations.

Contents

List of Abbreviations 1 1.1 Vision Statement 3 1.3 Themes & underlying currents 7

2 Overview of the State 11 3.1 What is a Communal Riot 29 3.3 Theories of Ethnic Violence 31

3.4.1 Extent of likely loss 31 3.5 Probable causes 34 3.7 Emerging Concerns 36

3.7.2 Changing profile of organised sector employment 37

3.8 Failures in handling Communal Riots 38

. 4.1  General 40

. 4.2  Agencies involved in managing riots 41

. 4.3  Prevention 42

4.3.1 Precautionary measures 42

. 4.3.1.a  Regulation 42

. 4.3.1.b  Riot Scheme 42

. 4.3.1.c  Regulating vulnerable locations 43

. 4.3.1.d  Preventive arrests    44

. 4.3.1.e  Peace committees 44

. 4.3.1.f  Countering rumours and monitoring media    45

4.3.2 Intelligence 45 4.3.3    Control room   46 4.4 Structural measures 46

. 4.4.1      Mock drills   46

. 4.4.2  Operational difficulties in preventive arrests 47

. 4.4.3      Transfer and Postings   47

. 4.4.4  Prosecution for violating curfews 48

. 4.4.5      Hardships caused by curfews   48

. 4.4.6  Registering offences during riots 48

        

Chapter 1: Introduction

         

Evolution of this Plan

Page

 

1

3

  

1.2

4

               

1.4

Objectives of the State Plan

9

              

3

Vulnerability Assessment and Risk Analysis

         

Why do Riots occur

29

  

3.2

29

               

3.4

31

             

3.4.2

                       

3.7.1

Hazard Risk Assessment and Vulnerability Mapping

 

Probability of occurrence

Increasing population density

32

   

3.6

Dynamics of Communal Riots

35

   

36

               

3.7.3

Changing political fabric

37

              

4

Preventive Measures

40

                                                        

4.4.7 Investigation of offences reported during riots 48 4.4.9 Role of Home Guards 50

5 Response
5.2 Criteria for level definition 52 5.4 L0 Activities 53

5.4.2 Intelligence 53

5.4.4 Logistic planning 54 5.4.6 Monitoring developments and preparedness 56 5.5.1 Up-gradation of SCR to EOC and Command Structure 58 5.5.3 Major tasks of the command 60

5.5.4.1 Setting priorities & objectives 61

5.5.4.3 Adopting overall strategy 62

. 5.6      L3 Responses   62

. 5.7  Schematic of the Process Flow 63

. 5.7.1  Threat perceived 63

. 5.7.2  Violence flares up 64

6    Preparedness Measures   66 6.1 Preparations for predetermined responses 66

. 6.1.1      Resource availability   66

. 6.1.2  Attending special needs of weaker sections 67

6.2    Capacity building   67

. 6.2.1  Incident command system 68

. 6.2.2      Strengthening fire services   68

6.3 Use of Media 69

. 7      Partnerships with other stakeholders   70

. 7.1  Communities 70

. 7.2    Academic institutions 70

. 7.3  Armed forces 71

. 7.4      NGOs   71

. 7.5  PSUs and Private Sector 71

. 8  Financial arrangements 73

. 9  Review and Updation 75

9.1 Schedule of riot drill 75

   

4.4.8

Communal representation in police

49

               

4.5

        

5.1

Training needs

Alert mechanism

50

  

51

   

51

               

5.3

Recommended measures

52

               

5.4.1

Promoting communal harmony

53

                     

5.4.3

    

5.4.5

                           

5.5.2

Manpower planning

53

Contingency planning & drills

Different sections of the command

56

   

5.5

Responses

58

   

59

               

5.5.4

61

             

5.5.4.2

Initial command meeting

 

Developing tactical objectives

62

                                                      

   

9.2.1 Approval & Review Process 76 9.3    Mainstreaming DM concerns with development plans   77 Annexure 1: Questionnaire for Home Department, GoUP 78

List of Abbreviations

CBO Community Based Organizations CRF Calamity Relief Fund
DCMO District Chief Medical Officer DMC Disaster Management Cell

DRM Disaster Risk Management
ESF Emergency Support Function
GoUP Government of Uttar Pradesh
IDDR International Decade for Disaster Reduction IMG Integrated Management Group
MO Medical Officer
NCC National Cadet Corps
NCDM National Centre for Disaster Management NDMF National Disaster Mitigation Fund
NDRF National Disaster Response Force
NYK Nehru Yuva Kendra
RC Relief Commissioner
SDMP State Disaster Management Plan
SIT Special Investigation Team
ULB Urban Local Bodies

                                              

IDRN

9.2

Action taken report

Government of India

76

   

CBDM

CSC

Community Based Disaster Management

 

CMG

Crisis Management Group

 

Community Service Centre

  

DM

DMF

Disaster Management

Disaster Mitigation Fund

 

EOC

GoI

Emergency Operations Centre

  

HPC

High Powered Committee

 

India Disaster Resource Network

       

LSG

Local Self Government

       

NAC

      

NCCF

Notified Area Committee

National Calamity Contingency Fund

       

NDMA

National Disaster Management Authority

       

NDMRC

     

NSS

National Disaster Mitigation Resource Centre

 

National Service Scheme

       

PM

      

SDMA

Prime Minister

                   

UNDP

State Disaster Management Authority

SHO

Station House Officer

 

SOP

Standard operating procedures

 

United Nations Development Programme

     

UPAAM UP Academy of Administration & Management WPR Work Participation Rate

 

UPSDMA

UP State Disaster Management Authority

     

PART I GENERAL

1.1 Vision Statement

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

To create a Disaster Management Plan that will provide all information required to understand, prevent and mitigate the threats it covers while complying with the provisions of all Acts, executive orders, guidelines; and will be the most authentic and useful resource for ensuring the state of preparedness to meet those threats and for effectively managing any disaster situation arising from those threats.

1.2 Evolution of This Plan

This Plan has been prepared as a deliverable under UPAAM letter no…. dated ….. The terms of reference require, inter alia, the plan to be in line with statutory provisions of the Central and UP State Disaster Management Acts, and also to incorporate the guidelines and executive orders issued by Ministry of Home Affairs GoI, and other instructions on the subject by GoI and GoUP. The mandate also gives specific details of some major issues to be covered under this Plan.

The Plan has evolved around the provisions, directives and objectives of related legislations, executive orders, and international development initiatives. The Plan incorporates the guidelines suggested by the two statutes – Disaster Management Act and Uttar Pradesh Disaster Management Act, Report of the High Powered Committee set up by GoI in 1999, NDMA, and UNDP.

While the objectives of a disaster management plan should remain the same whichever source it may originate from; the stance of a plan and its underlying thematic currents will tend to reflect the concerns of the originator; and the plans so drawn would acquire different hues reflecting the differences in those concerns. Such differences would not merely consist of variations in details but would. They would go much deeper, in as much as they would espouse different approaches and would assign different importance to various sub-goals.

For developing this Plan as correctly reflecting the current concerns, suggested plan contents and recommended guidelines by different sources were carefully examined. Any such plan is essentially in response to the prevailing needs of the community. It is based on the prevalent socio-economic-political situation in general and the availability of resources in particular. It would, thus, require modifications with changes in those needs or in the societal perspective or in the resource-availability situation. It is, therefore, considered appropriate to clearly articulate those needs and perspectives which form the backdrop of disaster management initiatives undertaken in the country so far. The next few paragraphs provide a brief summary of such initiatives and of the frameworks suggested by the aforesaid Acts / Authorities / Organisation to sketch the setting for this Plan.

In 1999 GoI set up an HPC under the Chairmanship of Shri J.C. Pant to formulate a comprehensive, systematic and holistic approach to disaster management. The HPC emphasized shifting the focus of disaster management from relief centric reactive approach to a proactive approach based on the culture of preparedness, quick response, strategic thinking and prevention. It prepared comprehensive model plans for DM at the national level and provided detailed guidelines for drawing up such plans at state and district levels. It also emphasized vulnerability based planning and graded disasters at three levels: L1, L2 and L3, while denoting L0 as a “no-disaster situation”. It introduced the concept of “Trigger Mechanism” to spontaneously set in motion the process of disaster response.

The disaster management planning received a new orientation with the passage of the Disaster Management Act, 2005. This Act created NDMA and stipulated preparation of a National Plan on Disaster Management in consultation with the State Governments and expert bodies. It also stipulated that every Ministry and Department of the Government of India should make provisions, in its annual plan budgets, for carrying out activities and programmes set out in the disaster management plans. It appears that similar stipulation has not been made in the UPSDM Act, which entered the statute-book before the enactment of the Central Act. Further, S40 of the Act stipulates that the DMP of every department of State Government shall lay down, inter alia, “the roles and responsibilities of the department of the State in the event of any threatening disaster situation or disaster and emergency support function it is required to perform” as also the “present status of its preparedness to perform such roles or responsibilities or emergency support function”.

In 2006 the Planning Commission, while formulating the Eleventh Five Year Plan (2007- 2012) examined the manner in which measures for disaster mitigation, preparedness and capacity building should be enhanced and integrated into the development plans of the Centre and the States and how to ensure that appropriate financial provisions for disaster management are built into the cost estimates.

Meanwhile in 2002, a Disaster Risk Management Programme was taken up in 169 districts in 17 multi-hazard prone States with the assistance from UNDP, USAID and European Union. Under this project, the States were assisted to draw up State, District and Block

level disaster risk management plans; village disaster risk management plans in conjunction with the Panchayati Raj Institutions. This programme also helped create disaster management teams at village levels onward, of volunteers trained in preparedness and response functions such as search & rescue, first aid, relief coordination, shelter management etc.

In addition to these, an all parties National Disaster Management Committee was constituted in 2001 with the PM as its chair in the aftermath of the Gujarat earthquake. The Committee invigorated the political will and various states, notably Orissa and Gujarat, created their SDMAs.

As may be seen, a lot of measures were being taken, suggested under different initiatives by different organizations. This has, occasionally, introduced variant terminologies. For instance UPAAM’s work order ….. refers to Crisis Management Groups (CMGs) at District / Block levels but the same body is referred to as Disaster Management Committee (DMC) in the UNDP Project on DRM.

The UNDP Project and NDMA’s initiatives led to creation of India Disaster Resource Network (IDRN), a powerful tool for prompt response to disaster situations.

As mentioned earlier the HPC report classified situations based on non-existence or severity of disaster as L0, L1, L2, and L3. Situations may arise in a number of cases where a disaster of unknown severity may appear impending without actually taking place. Examples would be formation of a cyclone heading towards Indian shores, swarms of locusts flying across international boundaries, intelligence reports on simmering civil disorder or communal tension etc. Naturally such information would be quickly shared, at appropriate levels, with the communities likely to be affected giving rise to “alert” situations. Such cases, L0 with “alert”, it was found, were so very different from L0 without “alert” that they merited a different category for themselves. (L0 with alert could be called “Warning Phase” of L1/L2 etc and the situation after occurrence of the disaster could be described as the “Impact Phase”.) However, as we already have a plethora of nomenclature, without actually naming such situations separately, this Plan emphasizes the changed roles of everyone concerned with disaster management when an “alert” is received.

The Plan is focused on the specific deliverables in the work order of UPAAM.

1.3 Themes and Underlying Currents

There are three essential themes running through the Plan: preparedness, development and equity. Preparedness implies a proactive approach, which emphasizes prevention and mitigation rather than reactive responses to an event; development underscores the inverse correlation between human sufferings during disaster and development status of a community; and equity ensures that the weak and helpless sections, which usually suffer worst during any disaster situation, are never lost sight of.

The HPC report defined a disaster as “an occurrence of a severity and magnitude that normally results in deaths, injuries, and property damage, and that cannot be managed through the routine procedures resources of government. It usually develops suddenly and unexpectedly and requires immediate, coordinated and effective response by multiple government, voluntary and private sector organizations to meet human needs and speed recovery”. DMA (the Act), on the other hand defines disaster as “a catastrophe, mishap, calamity or grave occurrence in any area, arising from natural or man made causes, or by accident or negligence which results in substantial loss of life or human suffering or damage to, and destruction of, property, or damage to, or degradation of, environment, and is of such a nature or magnitude as to be beyond the coping capacity of the community of the affected area”. Clearly, a situation becomes a disaster if the community is unable to cope with it in the normal course. Thus, the same situation may be a disaster for one community (of less coping capability) and a non-disaster situation for another. Accordingly, this Plan is first aimed at improving the “coping capacity” of the community, which if inadequate may turn even a relatively tame occurrence into a disaster. Thus the measures to be adopted for prevention and mitigation of disasters, that would improve the coping capacity of the society, constitute the first major theme of the Plan

The second theme weaves around the manner in which mitigation measures are to be integrated with development plans and projects of State. It is driven by two concerns; firstly the well established link between higher development level and lesser damage to human lives in disasters; secondly to ensure availability of funds for disaster mitigation activities on a regular basis. The Act defines “mitigation” as “measures aimed at reducing the risk, impact or effects of a disaster or threatening disaster situation”. Obviously

resources from Calamity Relief Fund (CRF) are not available for mitigation activities. Though there has been some thinking on Disaster Mitigation Fund (DMF) for sometime, and DMF is a statutory requirement for all States, still there seems to be no unanimity on what should constitute DMF.

One approach is that it may comprise all Plan schemes which qualify as ‘mitigation’ under the Act. Another is that it may consist of a fixed percentage of total plan allocation to be spent only on such mitigation activities that are not covered under any of the existing plan scheme. Planning Commission has suggested that 0.5% of the total plan allocation of each Ministry/ Department be earmarked for NDMF. The third approach, favoured most by cash strapped states is that DMF may only consist of a small token amount to be utilized for unforeseen mitigation measures. This Plan is driven by the realism that disaster management and development must move in tandem else decades of development gains may get lost in a few minutes of disaster. This realization calls for total internalization of DM processes in the planning processes making it the second major theme underlying this Plan.

The third theme of this Plan, “equity”, is borne out of the repeated observations that weaker sections continue to remain more exposed to sufferings from disaster risks than others. The powerless need more support from the community to cope with the hazards of disaster. To ensure that the special needs of pregnant ladies, lactating mothers, other women, children, aged and disabled are not lost in the flurry of operations the Plan has consciously kept them always in focus. A more effective way of ensuring it is to affirmatively seek their participation during preparedness and mitigation processes as well. As it is not practicable to seek participation of pregnant ladies in mock drills etc the Plan envisages participation of such sections of the community who are more acutely alive to their needs – hospitals, maternity homes, sanitaria and asylum (where existing) staff etc.

Other basic issues underlying the Plan are those raised by NDMA, namely, emphasis on Community Based Disaster Management (CBDM), awareness generation, training needs analysis, knowledge management, development of a state Human Resources (HR) plan, and early warning and forecasting system. As stipulated in the Act, the Plan also sets down standards for relief, rehabilitation etc.

1.4 Objectives of the State Plan

The only plausible objective for a Disaster Management Plan can be to ensure least human sufferings and least damage to properties form disastrous situations, and quickest recovery and reconstruction in post-disaster period. Viewed from this angle, the objectives of a Riot DMP would be:

1. To maintain law and order.

2. To provide information on time, to the people about the danger

3. To shift those at risk to safer places.

4. To ensure arrangement for food, shelter, and medicines for the affected people.

5. To protect vital installations and ensure smooth functioning of essential services.

6. To provide protection to properties belonging to members of public as well as to
the government

7. To minimize effective response time so that relief and rescue operations are undertaken immediately.

However, details of these activities and their tactical ramifications would form part of the District Riot Plans. At the State level the plan needs to be strategic – it should anticipate the resource requirements and logistic supports needed by the districts in their response actions. It should also aim at preventing the riots, and to this end an SDMP on communal riots should explore the reasons behind frequent occurrences of communal riots and what can be done to counter the socio-economic and political forces that tend to encourage communal violence.

This Plan sets out a roadmap in line with statutory provisions of the Act, UPSDM Act, also with the guidelines and executive orders issued by MHA, GoI, and other instructions on the subject by GOI and GoUP to achieve the final objective by setting some strategic goals, and identifies intermediate objectives as major milestones. The Plan aims at the following five strategic goals:

1. Professionalising the disaster management process

2. Making preparedness, risk reduction / mitigation parts of their normal processes
by concerned departments / organizations

3. Strengthening institutional mechanisms to achieve the highest degree of
coordination

4. Strengthening emergency response systems to ensure that responses are prompt and effective

5. Strengthening rehabilitation and recovery structure

The Plan sets out the following intermediate objectives:

1. Identification of risk reduction / mitigation activities for communal riots

2. Classification of necessary activities for effective preparedness for different
Departments / Organizations

3. Identifying emergency responses for different stages of communal riots

4. Situation analysis to understand and identify factors encouraging communal
violence and to set in place an institutional mechanisms for curbing such factors

5. Creating appropriate structure for seamlessly providing relief and humanitarian
assistance

6. Creating system and infrastructure for effective training and capacity building for
risk mitigation, prevention and response

7. Creating heightened awareness among the community-members by education and
communication activities

CHAPTER II OVERVIEW OF THE STATE

Uttar Pradesh is the largest state of India in terms of population and the fifth largest in terms of area. The state is divided in four economic regions i.e., Western, Central, Bundelkhand and Eastern. Lying largely in the Gangetic plains (except the Bundelkhand region), the economy of the state is still largely based on agriculture. This location in the Himalayan foothills and dependency on agriculture give rise to their own potential calamities. A scanty rainy season can lead to near drought conditions with drinking water scarcity; and a heavy rainfall can cause a flurry of floods destroying cultivation, damaging property, disrupting road transportation, water supply, electricity supply systems etc.

2.1 Topography

Uttar Pradesh is bounded by Nepal and Uttaranchal on the North, Haryana and Rajasthan on the west, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh on the south and Bihar and Jharkhand on the east. Situated between 23 o 52′ N and 31o 28’ N latitudes and 77o 3′ and 84o 39′ E longitudes, Uttar Pradesh can be divided into two distinct geographical regions:

  The Gangetic plain in the North, West, Centre and East.

  The Vindhyan hills and plateau in the south

The state has 71 districts, grouped in 17 divisions, again grouped in 4 regions, based on physiographic characteristics and varied social and economic conditions: the Eastern, Central, Western and Bundelkhand regions. The broad characteristics of these regions are;

Eastern region: Central region:

Western region:

Bundelkhand region:

Wide alluvial plains with dense rural population (776 persons per sq km), higher proportion of cultivated land.

Level riverine plane characterized by fertile alluvial soil, dense population (658 persons per sq km), lower rural density compared to Eastern region.

Varies from riverine alluvial plain to generally uniform and level with slight undulations towards south, slopes from north to south or south to east with reference to alignment of major rivers, economically developed and has larger urban centres; population density of 765 persons per sq km.

Northern part is plain, southern part has gentle undulating surface, due to undulating and rugged surface, Bundelkhand plateau has lower population concentration (280 persons per sq km) compared to other regions.

A map of UP showing the districts in each region is presented below:

Economic Regions, Uttar Pradesh

Western

Region Central Region

Eastern

Region Bundelkhand

   

2.2 Area and administrative divisions

The state of Uttar Pradesh is spread over 240,928 sq. km. comprising 71 districts 300 tehsils, 809 CD Blocks and 107,452 villages (including forest villages). The number of towns in the state is 694 of which 638 are statutory towns and 66 census towns.

2.3 Physical regions

Uttar Pradesh forms a major area of the Northern fertile plain known as the Indo- Gangetic plain. As already mentioned the Eastern, Western and Central regions lie in fertile alluvial plains, and the Bundelkhand region lies in the Vindhyan plateau. Its vast area, big and small rivers, varieties of climatic conditions, and different kinds of soils have bestowed a diversity of flora and fauna, which is hard to find elsewhere.

2.4 Climate

The climate of Uttar Pradesh is tropical monsoon in character. The standard temperature varies in the plains from 3-4oC in January to 43-45oC in May and June. Uttar Pradesh mainly experiences three distinct seasons – winter from October to February, summer from March to Mid June and the rainy season from mid June to September. The Himalayan region gets about 100-200cm of rain fall. The rainfall in the plains is heaviest in the east and decreases as one proceeds towards the north-west. Floods are a chronic problem of the state, causing damage to crops, life and property. Flood water during the rainy season becomes a major hindrance for tourists traveling to Uttar Pradesh. There are occasional cloud-bursts adding to the misery of the people. The most severe floods were in 1971, when 51 of the then 54 districts of the state were affected across nearly 52 lakh hectares.

The eastern districts are the most susceptible to floods, the western districts somewhat less and the central region markedly less. The eastern district’s proneness to floods is attributed, among other things, to heavy rainfall, low and flat topography, high subsoil water level and the silting of beds which causes river levels to rise. The problem in the western districts is mainly poor drainage caused by the obstruction of roads, railways, canals, new built-up areas etc. There is water logging over large areas. The major flood- prone rivers are the Ganga, Jamuna, Gomati, Ghaghra, Rapti, Sarda and Ramganga. The insufficient drainage capacity of the smaller western rivers Sirsa, Kali and the Aligarh drain is also a cause of floods.

2.5 Temperature and Rainfall

The seasons in Uttar Pradesh can be divided into Summer, Monsoon and Winter. The temperature varies with the change of seasons. Summer season, which is very hot and dry, continues from March to June. The temperatures during this season rise to 45oC, sometimes 47-48oC. There is low relative humidity of about (20%) and dust laden winds flow throughout the season. Monsoon season runs from June-September. The state receives 85% of average annual rainfall of 990 mm. during the season. The temperature is around 35-42°C on during the season. Winter season starts from October-February. The minimum temperature is around 3-4oC and sometimes goes below -1oC. The maximum temperature remains around 15 oC to 25 oC.

2.6 River systems and Dams

The state has a large network of rivers consisting of Ganga, Yamuna, Ghaghra, Saryu, Ramganga, Sharda, Rapti, Gandak, Gomti etc. These constitute perennial sources of water for the state. However, these rivers also cause serious floods during the months of August

and September in most of the districts in the state. The major dams in the state are listed below:

1. Matatila Dam is constructed on Betwa River in Lalitpur District

2. Parichha Dam is also built on the Betwa River near Parichha town, which is about 25 km from Jhansi. Its reservoir – a placid stretch of water that runs to
Notghat Bridge, 34 km away from Jhansi – is ideal for water sports.

3. Rihand Dam is built on Rihand River, a tributary of River Sone, at Pipri in Sonbhadra District, near the border of Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. It also produces power with its 6 units, each of 50 M.W. Many other seasonal and perennial rivers join the Rihand reservoir such as River Kanchan, Mayar and Azir.

4. Jamini Dam is constructed on Jamini River in Lalitpur District.

5. Rohini Dam is constructed on Rohini River in Lalitpur District.

6. Shahzad Dam is located on the outskirts of Lalitpur. It is built across the
Shahzad River, a tributary of the Jamini River. It is a major source for irrigation
in Lalitpur District and a major tourist attraction in the region.

7. Govind Sagar Dam too is constructed on Shahzad River in Lalitpur District.

8. Sajnam Dam, is constructed across the River Sajnam, a tributary of the Jamini
near Chandawali in Lalitpur District. It is a major irrigation source and also a
tourist attraction.

9. Sukma-Dukma Dam is constructed on Betwa River near Jhansi District.

10. Arjun Dam is an earthen type dam on Arjun river at Charkhari, about 20 km

from Mahoba.
11. Lakheri Dam, in Jhansi district, provides irrigation facilities to the villages in the

region and is a major source of water in Garautha tehsil.
12. Maudaha Dam, situated in Rath tehsil of Hamirpur district, is constructed across

the Birma River, a tributary of the Betwa River. Apart from irrigation, Maudaha

Dam provides drinking water to the larger parts of the region.
13. Obra Dam, situated in the outskirts of Sonbhadra, across the Rihand River, supplies water to the Obra Thermal Power House. The dam also has hydel power

generation capacity of 99 MW.

14. Rajghat Dam, constructed on the Betwa River at 22 kms from Lalitpur, is a joint venture of the Governments of Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh.

2.6 Demography
2.6.1 Population
The total population of Uttar Pradesh, as per 2001 Census is 166,197,921 comprising of 87,565,369 males and 78,632,552 females. 79.21 percent resides in the rural areas. The total number of households comes to 25,757,640. The average size of households in the state is 6. The proportion of scheduled caste and scheduled tribe population to the total population in the state comes to 21.1 and 0.1 respectively. The density of the state stands at 690 persons per sq. kms. A map showing density by districts in the state is given below:

Population Density by Districts

2.6.2 Religious Communities

Major religious communities are Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Sikh, Buddhist and Jain. As much as 80.61% are Hindus followed by 18.50% Muslims. The population of other religious communities is negligible. There are 24 districts with a higher population of Muslims than the state average. The top five such districts are: Rampur (49.14%), Moradabad (45.54%), Bijnor (41.71%), Jyotiba Phule Nagar (39.38%) and Saharanpur (39.11%). Other districts with more than state average of Muslim population are Muzaffarnagar, Balrampur, Bahraich, Bareilly, Meerut, Siddharthnagar, Shrawasti, Baghpat, Sant Kabir Nagar, Ghaziabad, Pilibhit, Barabanki, Budaun, Bulandshahr, Lucknow, Gonda, Sitapur, Kheri and Mau.

2.6.3 Sex Ratio

It is the number of females per 1000 males in a given area and is indicative of the condition of females in the society. The Indian Census also provides the sex ratio in the age group 0-6 so as to gauge the discrimination between the boy and the girl child. The sex ratio of the state is 898 while that in the age group 0-6 is 916. There is a difference of 18 points in the sex ratio of two age groups. It indicates that more care is taken in upbringing of male child than that of a female child. The four districts in UP with a female dominated sex ratio are Azamgarh (1020), Jaunpur (1014), Pratapgarh (1004) and Deoria (1002). The lowest sex ratios have been recorded in Shahjahanpur (842), Budaun (842), Gautam Buddha Nagar (841) and Mathura (840).

2.6.4 Literacy and Education

The literacy rate of the state is quite low at 56.3%. Uttar Pradesh ranks 17th in literacy rate among 19 major states. The state has an identical female literacy rank among the major states with 42.20%. Among districts, Kanpur Nagar (74.37%), Auraiya (70.50%) and Ghaziabad (69.74%) have the highest overall literacy rate. The lowest ranked are Bahraich (35.16%), Balrampur (34.60%) and Shrawasti (33.82%). In female literacy, the top three districts are Kanpur Nagar (67.46%), Lucknow (60.47%) and Auraiya (59.13%), while the lowest three are Bahraich (22.78), Balrampur (21.79%) and Shrawasti (18.58%). A map showing female literacy is given below:

18.6-28.0

28.1-35.0

35.1-40.0

40.1-50

50.1-67.5

58 53.7 42.5

34.6 33 27.9
35.2 35.1

2.6.5 Educational Level

50

46.1 49.2 53.1

District Wise Female Literacy Rate

47.8

25.1 43.4 46.3 39.3

36.3 36.8

35.4

22.8 18.6
34.6 21.8

43
48.3 50.9

33

48.6 51.4 49.2

27.1 27.9

57.4 49.2

41.6 42.3
39.3 40.9 45.3

29.6

42.9
42.5

43.4 48.7 43.2

44 53

44.1 33.7

50.2

40.1
36.4 36.8

29.8 50.3

59.1

54.6 67.5

34.3 27.2
60.5 36.9 34.9

41.9

41.5 46.4

44.1 38.4

39.3

4.3% of all literates in the State are without any formal education level. These persons have not achieved any educational level but can read and write with understanding as per the 2001 Census. It means they have not attended any formal school. 25.4% of the literates are educated up to below primary and 24.7% up to primary levels. Thus, over half of the literates have not completed school education beyond primary level. Those achieving middle and Matric / Secondary level of education are 18.9 and 12.0%. It may be seen that 56.3% are literate and of those as many as 85.4 % have either achieved a level below matriculation or none at all. Thus only about 8% of the total population has received education beyond secondary level. Among the two major religious communities, Hindus appear to be marginally better educated. The table given below presents full details.

8.28% 6.76%

10.64%

13.91%
14.30%

43.70%

2.42%

Illiterates
No formal education level Below primary level Primary level
Middle level
Secondary level
Beyond secondary level

Educational Level in the Two major Religious Communities in UP

    

Educational Level

All Religions Hindus Muslims

PMFPMFPMF

               

Literates to total population

  

56.3

  

68.8

  

42.2

  

58.0

  

71.2

  

43.1

  

47.8

  

57.3

  

37.4

 

Literate with no education 4.3 4.0 4.9 Primary 24.7 23.2 27.3

3.7 3.5 4.1 7.7

24.1 22.4 27.3 28.1

12.6 14.1 9.9 8.6
8.4 9.2 6.9 4.6  4.8 4.3

6.8 9.1

28.3 27.9

Below primary

 

25.4

 

23.1

 

29.6

 

24.2

 

21.9

 

28.5

 

32.5

 

30.2

 

36.5

 

Middle

 

18.9

 

20.1

 

16.8

 

19.8

 

20.8

 

17.8

 

14.6

 

16.2

 

11.8

 

Matric/Secondary 12.0

13.4 9.5

9.4 7.2

HS / Inter / Pre-U / SS

 

7.9

 

8.6

 

6.5

           

Others not equal to Degree 0.2 0.2 0.1
Graduate & above    6.6   7.3   5.1   7.0   7.9   5.4   3.6   4.0   3.0

2.6.6 Socio-economic profile

0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2

0.3 0.2

                  

With population of 16.6 million in 2001, the State has 16.17% of the country’s population living on 240,928 sq. kms, which is 7.3 % of the country’s area. The population density as is 689 per sq. km while the national average is 324 per sq. km. Largest sector is agriculture, it employs 72 % of the labour force and accounts for 46 percent of the state income. Although predominantly an agriculture driven state and the largest producer of food grains, UP is the third poorest in terms of per capita production of food grains as well as in terms of growth rate in the production of food grains.

Uttar Pradesh ranks low on most of the social development indicator in spite of being the most populous state in the country. The state domestic product increased @ 3% during 1997-2002 against national average of 5.3% during same period. The state’s contribution in National Income according to quick estimates for 2002-2003 was 8.3%, placing UP among poorest states in the country.

In 1973-74, the number of persons below the poverty line was 53.5 million, which were about 57 percent of the states’ population. It was about 16.7 % of the total number of persons living below poverty line in the entire country. The number of persons living below poverty line is 31.15 % in 1999-2000 compared to all India 26.10%. Out of this the poverty ratio in rural areas is 31.22 % and that is the urban areas 30.89 %. It is revealed that though there is a significant declining trend, yet the number of persons living below poverty line in the state remains above 50 millions within a span of 27 years. About 41 million population below poverty line lives in rural area.

2.7 Economic Activity

The work participation rate or WPR (work population rate is arrived at by dividing the

number of workers with
total population) in the
state is 32.5 percent as per
the results of 2001 Census.
The male WPR is 46.8
percent while that for
females is only 16.5. The
economy in Uttar Pradesh
is basically agricultural. Thus, the proportion of workers engaged in cultivation, whether as

27.2-29.9 30.0-32.3 32.4-36.0

36.1-43.2

29.5

35.5 41.4
31.1 42.4
32.3 38.1

39.1
34.2

28.2 33.1 32.7 29.9

28.2

Work Participation Rate

28.5 31.9 30.3 40.3

30.6 37.2 29.3

27.2

31 28.3

30 28.8

30.3 28 28.6

31.4

27.2

43.2

27.5 27.5

37

32.9 36.8 34
29.8 35.3 34.4

32.9 34.3 39.4

30.1
28.5

36

32.8 29.9

39.2 42.3

35.6 32.1 33.4

30.5 31.3

32.3 31.4

37.7 40.3

33.5 33.9

28.8

42.3

32.1

39.2

31.1 28.7

33.8
36.8

cultivators or agricultural labourers, is as high as 65.9%. The proportion of Household Industry workers is 5.6%. Rest 28.5 % is engaged in the category of other workers which includes the secondary and tertiary sectors. A map showing Work Participation Rate by district is presented in the graphic on this page.

2.7.1 Agriculture

Uttar Pradesh economy is primarily agrarian in nature. Agriculture contributes about 40 percent to the state gross domestic production as against 25 percent at the national level. This sector engages over 70 percent of the population and 65 percent work force in the state. State has a geographical area 24.2 million hectares and out of this 16.8 million hectares area is actually cultivated. The un-irrigated area is 3.98 million hectare. The state is geographically located in the most fertile tract of indo-gangetic plains. The state has good soils and water availability through rainfall and river flow.

Uttar Pradesh is largest producer of wheat in the country contributing about 36 percent of the all India production whereas UP is second largest producer of rice, contributing about 15 percent to the national production. The area under these crops is predominantly less than the contribution in terms of production. UP is the second largest pulses producing state in India, contributing to about 45 percent of national production; but its production falls short of what is needed to feed its population. Similarly, in oilseed crops, state is contributing about 18 percent production of rapeseed / mustard. State also contributes about 45 percent sugarcane production in the country. The state is largest producer of potato with about 40 percent of national production while its contribution of mango and guava are about 40 and 46 percent respectively. In all, the state produces about 10 million tonnes of fruits and 17 million tonnes of vegetables.

2.7.2 Industry

Uttar Pradesh ranks fifth in the country both in terms of number of factories and of invested capital. In 2003-04 it had 9,237 factories, comprising 7.2% of total 129,074 factories in India. Growth of industry in UP is not keeping pace with the national growth rate. During 2003-06 UP received only 5 approvals of total 213 industry parks approved in the country.

Uttar Pradesh has 65,538 SSI units i.e., 11.3% of all SSI units in India and ranks fourth in the country in number of SSIs. It has one operational special economic zone at Noida and three approved and under establishment SEZs, one for textiles at Moradabad, and two multi-product SEZs at Bhadohi and Kanpur.

The industrial growth of Uttar Pradesh has been primarily driven by four factors, namely, the traditional skills of local artisans (carpets, brassware, bangles etc), availability of agriculture produce as industrial inputs (sugar, alcohol, other downstream chemicals), its proximity to national capital and huge population and large tracts of agricultural land that offer a big market for many manufactured produce. The first three growth drivers have contributed to concentrated pockets of industrialization.

Terai region has a number of sugar mills and a few chemical units that use molasses as feed. Kanpur / Agra have well developed leather industry, Eastern UP has weaving – textiles and carpets, Moradabad has brassware, Shikohabad has bangles and Khurja has ceramic potteries. Ghaziabad, a district adjoining the national capital has a large number of manufacturing units and newly developed NOIDA has forged ahead in services sector. UP State Industrial Development Corporation (UPIDC) has created a number of industrial states, which have attracted many prestigious industries. UP also has Hindalco, one of the major aluminium manufacturers of the country at Renukoot and an atomic power plant at Narora.

Manufacturing however is the last in contribution to the State Gross Domestic Product. In 2004-05 secondary sector (manufacturing) accounted for 24% of SGDP, primary sector (mostly agriculture) contributed 33% and, tertiary sector comprising transportation, communication, banking, real estate and other services, contributed maximum at 43%. The growth rate of the States SGDP, in line with the trend in national income, had risen from a 1% in 2000-01 to 5.8% in 2002-03. It stood at 4.8% during the year 2004-05. Over the five-year period (2000-05), tertiary sector posted a compounded annual growth rate of 5.5%; secondary sector at 4.4%, and primary sector grew at just 1.8%. Per Capita Income of the state, at 2004-2005 prices, stands at Rs.11477.

2.7.3 Mines

Uttar Pradesh has limestone in Mirzapur and Sonebhadra districts; dolomite in Mirzapur, Sonebhadra and Banda districts, glass-sand in Allahabad Banda and Mau districts; marble in Mirzapur and Sonebhadra districts; bauxite in Banda; non-plastic fireclay in Mirzapur; and Uranium in Lalitpur district. Besides, Barytes and Edalusite are found in the districts of Mirzapur and Sonbhadra. Southern parts of Sonbhadra district also have sizeable coal deposits mined by Northern Coalfields Limited, a public sector company with headquarters in Chhattisgarh. Sand-stone, pebbles, reh, salt punter, morang, sand and other minor minerals are also found in the State. Mirzapur – Sonbhadra area can be considered as the most significant mining belt of the state.

2.8 Health Infrastructure

Health infrastructure in the State is far from adequate, as would be

evident from this table:

5823 711 14789 – 263 373 NA

Particulars

   

Required

   

In place

   

Shortfall

 

Sub-Centres (SCs)
Community Health Centres (CHCs)
Health Worker (Male) MPW(M) at SCs
Health Assistant (Male) at PHCs
Obstetricians & Gynaecologists at CHCs Paediatricians at CHCs
Radiographers 386

Primary Health Centres (PHCs)

MPW (Female)/ANM at SCs & PHCs

Health Assistant (Female)/LHV at PHCs

Doctor at PHCs

26344 20521 1097 386 20521 5732 3660 4061 386 123 386 13 NA

4390

           

24181

                       

3660

3660

21900

730

   

2281

   

3660

2128

1532

   

NA

NA

               

Physicians at CHCs

386

123

263

               

Total specialists at CHCs

1544

413

1131

                   

2.9 Transport and communication 2.9.1 Roads

The state has the largest road network in the country after Maharashtra. There are 31 National Highways (NH), with a total length of 4,942 km (8.5% of total NH length in India). Total road length in the state is 248,481 km (2002), of which 67% (166,659 km) is surfaced and has the largest surfaced urban road network in the country i.e. 50,721 km, as on 2002. Besides total road length of PWD in the state is 118946 km. This includes 3869

km of national highways, 9097 km of state highways, 105980 of other district roads and 72,931 km of rural roads.

2.9.2 Railway

The state has the largest railway network in India with a total length of 8546 kms. Almost all the major as well as small cities in Uttar Pradesh are linked through railways. Cargo carried within the northern and north-eastern zone of the railways is approximately 133 million tonnes. Lucknow is the main junction of the northern network. Other important railway junctions are Agra, Kanpur, Allahabad, Mughalsarai, Jhansi, Moradabad, Varanasi, Tundla, Gorakhpur, Gonda, Faizabad, Bareilly and Sitapur.

2.9.3 Airports Uttar Pradesh

is well connected to Delhi and other cities in India. Uttar Pradesh has

various medium and small sized airports that have the facility to operate and host flights. Some of the major cities that are connected through Air-service are Lucknow, Kanpur, Varanasi, Jhansi, Allahabad, Agra, Bareilly, Hindon (Ghaziabad), Gorakhpur, Sarsawa (Saharanpur) and Fursatganj (Raebareli). All these cities have airports, some (notably Lucknow, Varanasi, Agra, Jhansi) host flights from major cities in India. Varanasi and Lucknow have International Airports. Among the domestic airports, Lucknow is the best in terms of connection and infrastructure. The city is well connected to almost all the major destinations in India such as Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Agra, Jaipur, Varanasi and

Patna among others.

2.10 Disaster Vulnerability of Uttar Pradesh

The physiographic profile of the state, described in details in this Chapter, bring to fore the following issues regarding its disaster vulnerability and challenges it may face in managing a disaster:

Natural disasters: Among the natural disasters, many are caused by weather factors – floods, storms, tsunami, hurricanes etc. UP, not being a coastal state is not exposed to tsunamis or seasonal hurricanes that form over seas. State is however exposed to the following natural disasters:

 Lying in close proximity to the Himalayan Range exposes UP to earthquake risks  Dependence on rain fed agriculture over vast areas exposes the state to droughts  Its riparian system exposes it to floods
 Western agricultural districts of the state are also exposed to locusts

Man made disasters: Population mix, concentration of industries, international borders, dams over rivers – all aggravate the potential threats from man made disasters.

 The population mix of the state gives rise to occasional communal clashes
 Long and porous international border makes it an easy target for anti national

elements
 An atomic power plant in the state keeps the risks of a Cherbonyl type disaster

looming over the horizon
 The number of large and medium sized dams / reservoirs expose UP to the

disasters arising from dam-bursts
 Concentration of industries in certain areas (and consequent mobility of

population) may assist and promote simmering dissatisfaction among large number of peoples and lead to civil disturbance

The socio economic features of the state – low literacy level in certain districts and huge gaps in health infrastructure pose challenges in managing a disaster situation. It is not improbable that in certain villages of Eastern districts there might not be any person capable of understanding leaflets containing instructions on dealing with a disaster situation. Moreover, low education levels make a population more susceptible to machinations of anti national elements.

Inadequacies in health care system – both of trained persons and infrastructure – make it necessary to move casualties over large distances for proper treatment. This can be a big challenge during floods when roads may get submerged and large tracts get cut off. Concentration of industries and changes in the level of industrialization across the state have impacted the dynamics of labour migration with consequent effects on the social fabric that need to be kept in view while formulating any disaster management plans.

Against this background, three major causes of potential disasters in the state are described briefly.

2.10.1 Earthquakes

An earthquake is a series of vibrations on the earth’s surface. It occurs without warning. It can cause grave damage to life and wreck the economy with long lasting adverse effects. Thus years of development gains may be lost in just a few seconds of a high intensity earthquake.

Earthquakes are caused due to the moving plates below the surface of the earth. Major earthquakes often occur around the edges of the moving plates and at other weak places in the crust called faults. Based on these faults the whole country is divided into Seismic Zones; Zone V being the highest risk zone. UP does not have any area falling under Zone V. The districts falling under Zones II, III and IV are noted below. The entire Himalayan Region is considered to be vulnerable to high intensity earthquakes

Zone IV : Entire districts of Saharanpur, Muzaffarnagar, Bagpat, Bijnor, Meerut, Ghaziabad, Gautambuddh Nagar, JP Nagar, Rampur, Moradabad, Bulandshar, Shravasti, Balrampur, Siddharthnagar, Maharajganj, Kushinagar, and parts Of Pilibhit, Shajahanpur, Kheri, Baharaich, Gonda, Mathura, Aligarh, Budaun, Bareilly, Basti, Sant Kabir Nagar, Deoria and Ballia.

Zone III: Entire districts of Sonbhadra, Chandauli, Ghazipur, Varanasi, Jaunpur, Azamgarh, Gorakhpur, Sultanpur, Raebareli, Faizabad, Unnao, Lucknow, Barabanki, Sitapur, Hardoi, Kannauj, Mainpuri, Firozabad, Etah, Mahamayanagar, Farukkabad, and parts of Mirzapur, Pratapgarh, Kanpurnagar, Auraiya, Etawah, Agra, Mathura,

Aligarh, Badaun, Bareilly, Pilibhit, Kheri, Baharaich, Gonda, Basti, Sant Kabir Nagar, Deoria and Ballia.

Zone II : Entire districts of Lalitpur, Jbansi, Mahoba, Jalaun, Banda, Kausambi, Seismic Zones in Uttar Pradesh

Allahabad and parts of Agra, Etawah, Auraiya, Kanpur Nagar, Fatehpur, Pratapgarh

and Mirzapur.
(The overlapping zones showed in the map above indicate that the whole district does not fall into a single zone.)

2.10.2 Flood Prone Areas

Floods are a chronic problem of the state, causing damage to crops, life and property. Flood waters during the rainy season often disrupt transport systems. The most severe floods were in 1971, when 51 of the 54 districts of the state were affected.
The eastern districts are the most susceptible to floods, the western districts somewhat less and the central region markedly less. The eastern district’s proneness to floods is attributed, among other things, to heavy rainfall, low and flat topography, high subsoil water level and the silting of beds which causes river levels to rise. The problem in the western districts is mainly poor drainage caused by the obstruction of roads, railways, canals, new built-up areas etc. There is water logging in the large areas. The major flood- prone rivers are the Ganga, Jamuna,Gomati ,Ghaghra ,Rapti, Sarda, Gandak and Ramganga. (Source: NDMA Guidelines)

Zone IV

Zone III

Zone II

Overlapping Z IV & Z III

Overlapping Z III & Z II

 

Area vulnerable to floods

The Ganga River basin of U.P. experiences normal rainfall in the region from 60 cm to 190 cm of which more than 80% occur during the southwest monsoon. The rainfall increases from west to east and from south to north. Similar is the pattern of floods, the problem increases from west to east and south to north. Out of the 240.93 lakh hectares geographical area of the State about 73.06 lakh hectares is flood prone. As per the Irrigation Department’s estimate, only 58.72 lakh can actually be protected. Up to March 2004, only 16.01 lakh hectares has been protected. The eastern districts as well as those situated in the Terai region bordering Nepal are the most affected. Due to floods, an average of 26.89 lakh hectares is affected annually, and the estimated loss to crops, houses and livestock is to the tune of Rs.432 crore annually. Apart from these, loss of human life also occurs.

2.10.3 Drought Prone Areas

Drought is generally considered to be occurring when the principal monsoons fail or are deficient or scanty. Monsoon failure results in crop failure, shortage of drinking water as well as undue hardship to the rural and urban community. Drought is declared for each state or part(s) of a state by the State Government under the Relief Manuals or similar documents of the State Government. Declaration of drought is primarily based on the quantum of rainfall, damage to kharif crops and lesser availability of drinking water and

less moisture in the soil. It may be mentioned that there is no universally accepted definition of drought.

The identified drought prone districts of UP are Allahabad, Banda, Hamirpur, Jalaun, Mirzapur and Varanasi, Hathras, Mainpuri, Bareilly, Hardoi, Unnao, Rae Bareli, Farrukhabad, Kannauj, Kanpur Dehat, Fatehpur, Sultanpur, Basti, Sant Kabir Nagar, Kushinagar, Deoria, Mau, Ballia, Jaunpur and Ghazipur.

PART II: DISASTER SPECIFIC COMMUNAL RIOTS

Chapter 3
Vulnerability Assessment and Risk Analysis

3.1 What is a Communal Riot?

A riot is “a violent disturbance of the peace by an assembly or body of persons”. It becomes a communal riot if disturbance of peace is caused by distinct community(ies) and is aimed at other distinct community(ies). A group of persons stopping traffic and burning vehicles will be described as riotous behaviour, it will assume communal overtone only if the rioting group belongs to a distinct community and its fury is aimed at properties belonging to members of another distinct community.

Usually, in the Indian context a communal riot implies violent behaviour of the two major communities – Hindus and Muslims. In past few decades, however, on several occasions Sikh and Christian communities too have faced the ire of Hindu mobs.

A communal riot often flares up with a seemingly insignificant incidence. However, once started, the speed at which the violence spreads suggests that the violent activities were pre-planned with logistic support already put in place. Thus even if the insignificant incidence that triggered the violence were spontaneous the subsequent follow up behaviour was not so. The cause of riot, then, cannot be the minor incidence that triggered it but some deep underlying forces that had kept the communities in preparedness for violence.

3.2 Why do riots occur?

An SDMP on communal riots, if it is to be based on the cultures of prevention and preparedness, must look into the causes of communal riots. A lot of works in this field has been done by academics, journalists and at times politicians. Their findings are rarely same. However, it is almost universally agreed that the immediate / proximate causes of riots often hide the true causes that emanate from the social structure and historical forces. Determining the true cause can be a very involved issue as different causes may surface at different levels of enquiry.

It is useful to examine the causality at three levels. The first constitute the incidences that trigger violence, referred to as the primary cause. Such incidences can be spontaneous or can be outcome of some planning. Teasing a girl of another community would perhaps be a spontaneous act; in many cases no more than a youthful excess. Playing music in front

of a masjid during prayers can perhaps never be a spontaneous act of vandalism. Some careful planning usually precedes such acts. Perpetrators anticipate reactions and plan countermoves. Very often the motive is visible – a message to the opposition community for a local leadership issue, asserting rights over some local resource such as a river ghat, consolidating own community (in the wake of a communal clash) for an upcoming election and so on. The leadership issue, local resource or the upcoming election manifest the secondary cause. Primary and secondary causes, jointly, can be taken as immediate or proximate causes. These proximate causes must be covered in an SDMP on Communal Riots.

The third level of enquiry into why riots occur seeks causality in social structure and historical forces. This would perhaps fall beyond the scope of a DMP. It still needs to understood by those managing riots as it often provides the perspective to see patterns in sporadic events occurring at distant places at different points in time. Removing such forces or even diminishing their intensities belongs to the realm of polity. Still, police the PA for controlling riots may have a crucial role.

For example, a riot can be seen to arise out of (justified?) majority resentment against a minority’s alleged disloyalty to or betrayal of the country. Then measures to curb the minority’s demands and to put its disloyal members in their place would be the required response. Another example, if riots are seen as a consequence of provocation of a harassed minority by militant Hindu nationalists, then measures to be taken would be to protect the minority and constrain militant Hindu groups. In both cases the remedial measures fall well within the domain of the police.

At this stage, it should be noted that such analysis of underlying causes may give rise to another complexity. If a riot is interpreted as a result of the outrage felt by one community on, say, disloyalty / betrayal revealed by another then this very interpretation would contribute to the failure to prosecute the perpetrators of violence even when their identities are well known.

3.3 Theories of Ethnic Violence

There are three major theories to explain presence or absence of ethnic violence in mixed communities. The theories are based on a) inter-ethnic associational ties, b) political incentives and c) intra-ethnic self policing.

First theory argues that associational ties between Hindus and Muslims prevent communal riots. Proponents of this theory have found evidences that cities with strong inter-ethnic associational activities have remained peaceful during periods of Hindu-Muslim tension though the smallest incidents exploded into major riots in cities that lacked such inter- ethnic civic life.

According to the second theory electoral incentives are the best predictor of whether or not a riot will occur. Politicians, who control the police and security forces, give clear orders to prevent them, only when it suits them. It depends on how important the minority vote is for the incumbent parties / coalition partners in power.

The third model holds that riots can be prevented with intra-ethnic self policing; i.e. through a mechanism in which community leaders punish community members guilty in inter-ethnic disputes. This often fails because inter-ethnic information links are weaker than the intra-ethnic ones.

3.4 Hazard risk assessment and vulnerability mapping

HPC report defines hazard as “a rare event that threatens to adversely affect human life property of activity to the extent of causing disaster’ and risk as “the expected loss (casualties, damage to property, and disruption of economic activity or livelihood) caused by a particular phenomenon”. Risk, naturally, is product of likely loss in case of the occurrence of the hazardous event and the probability of the occurrence of the event itself. The two aspects – extent of likely loss and the probability of the occurrence of risk events are considered separately.

3.4.1 Extent of likely loss: Communal riots invariably cause loss of human lives and destruction of properties. A riot may thus take away the gains of several decades of development and put the community back. While it is not possible to accurately estimate the losses arising from a potential riot at any place, a rough assessment of likely loss can be made with the following indicators:

a. Loss of human lives will usually vary with the density of people living in the locality. More crowded areas are likely to suffer higher loss of human lives. An

attack by a riotous mob on cinema halls, places of worship during festivals, railway

stations, educational institutions etc may take very high tolls of human lives.

b. Isolated, unprotected dwellings are easier to be broken into by rioters. Existence of such isolated dwellings – isolation could be geographical (with no houses nearby) or social – a house belonging to a member of one community surrounded by houses belonging to the members of another community, increase the hazard
risk.

c. Finally, loss of human lives can be significantly higher in an area which becomes
inaccessible due to any reason or in an area with inadequate medical facilities.

d. Extent of loss of properties will first depend on existence of properties. This
increases the hazard risk of cities compared to that of towns and so on.

3.4.2 Probability of occurrence of a riot: Notwithstanding the pan-national social structure and historical forces that have kept communal violence alive for centuries, study of past riots have revealed some pointers. Analysis of these pointers may help assess the probability of a riot at different centres.

a. The first is the demographic profile of the centre. Mobs do not form if they feel threatened by an overwhelming opposition. Such opposition can come from large population of the opposite community. Accordingly, communal riots rarely take place at a centre overwhelmingly populated by any one community. On the other hand, such centres where one community forms more than, 25-30% of the population (but less than 70%) are far more vulnerable than centres that have over 80% population belonging to one community.

b. Another major cause is existence of a dispute between two communities. The dispute may be due to economic reasons – sharing of a natural resource, owning some property etc. It can also be over some place of worship, or perceived rights etc. The underlying dispute mutates into communal violence from time to time. Thus some centres have history of communal violence and are know as riot prone centres.

c. In recent times communal violence is seen to be erupting over religious conversion or re-conversions; thus wherever conversions are seen to be going up unusually, communal tension should be expected to rise.

Against this backdrop, vulnerability risk mapping of the State has been done. The parameters considered are the population size, its demographic profile and the history of communal violence observed over the past few decades. (Economic significance of a city / urban agglomerate is captured in its population size.) History of riots has been considered on a scale of 1 to 5 and risk on a scale of 1 to 10.

Towns/Urban agglomerates

Population in lacs

 

Hindu (%)

Muslim (%)

 

History

 

Assessed risk hazard

 

1

Kanpur

27.16

77.4

20.4

5

10

2

Varanasi

12.04

69.5

29.8

5

9

3

Meerut

11.62

62.5

34.6

5

8

4

Moradabad

6.42

 

50.1

48.5

 

5

 

8

 

5

Saharanpur

4.56

51.9

44.2

5

8

6

Firozabad

4.33

 

57.5

39.1

 

5

 

8

 

7

Maunath Bhanjan

2.13

42.2

57.5

5

8

8

Lucknow

22.46

 

72.7

 

25.5

 

3

 

7

 

9

Aligarh

6.69

57.4

41.0

4

7

10

Muzaffarnagar

3.32

  

59.1

37.9

  

4

  

6

  

11

Sambhal

1.82

22.8

76.9

4

6

12

 

Bareilly

 

7.48

 

59.6

  

38.1

  

3

  

5

  

13

Gorakhpur

6.23

78.0

20.6

3

5

14

 

Farrukhabad- cum-Fatehgarh

 

2.43

 

75.3

  

23.2

 

3

 

5

 

15

Hapur

2.12

68.2

30.0

3

5

16

 

Faizabad

 

2.08

 

78.8

  

19.8

 

3

 

5

 

17

Bahraich

1.68

43.1

55.8

3

5

18

 

Amroha

 

1.65

 

26.8

  

72.6

  

3

  

5

  

19

Jaunpur

1.60

66.0

33.3

3

5

20

 

Modinagar

 

1.40

 

91.8

  

6.4

 

3

 

5

 

21

Mughalsarai

1.16

82.1

16.0

3

5

22

Chandausi

 

1.04

 

74.8

  

24.4

 

3

 

5

 

Extent of damage also depends on the level of violence observed in a riot. Historically riots in Meerut, Moradabad, Varanasi, Kanpur and Aligarh have been very violent. Further, with eruption of riots in these centres, communal tension gets built in nearby centres which unless promptly resolved may take an ugly turn. Most of these smaller centres do not have much of a history of independent riots, their vulnerability mainly arises from their proximity (both geographical and socio-economical) to major riot prone centres . The following table lists centres where communal tension gets spilled over:

Major Riot Prone Centre

  

Satellite centres

 

  

Varanasi Jaunpur, Ghazipur, Azamgarh, Mughalsarai

Meerut  Bulandshahr, Modinagar, Saharanpur

Aligarh Hathras,

In past communal tensions at Meerut and Moradabad have been known to feed on each other; however, since 1990 Meerut has not witnessed communal riots as seen earlier.
3.5 The probable causes

The National Police Commission in its 6th Report has covered Communal Riots in details and has numerated some of the proximate causes for the riots, classified under the following broad heads:

1. Religious

a. Playing of music before mosques and other places of Muslim worship either
during prayer or afterwards ;

b. Claiming of a place, as a place of worship, by both the communities ;

c. Desecration of a place of worship of the Muslim by the Hindu or vice versa ;

d. Killing or alleged killing of a cow or an animal held sacred by Hindus, by a
member of the Muslim community ; and

e. Desecration of a religious congregation by some loitering animals abhorred by a
community.

2. Personal

a. Alleged molestation or rape of a woman of one community by a member of the other community;

b. Assault on a member of one community by a member of the other community, though the assault might itself be due to some private quarrel;

c. Quarrel between a tenant of one community with a landlord of the other community;

d. Dispute between two neighbours belonging to different communities over some minor matter; and

e. In some of the recent incidents, buying of property in urban areas for commercial exploitation had created serious tensions. Properties have to be sold at a price below the market price, because they carry some legal encumbrances. Efforts to remove these encumbrances particularly of those caused by the

 

Moradabad

Chandausi, Amroha, Muzaffarnagar, Sambhal, Saharanpur

          

members of the opposite community rouse communal passions which may lead to communal riots

3. Reactive

a. A reaction to a situation which happens elsewhere in the country; and

b. A reaction generally by Muslims to some incidents taking place outside the
country; this reaction normally manifests in large processions by the Muslims which creates a sense of insecurity and fear in the minds of the opposite community (for example, reaction or the Muslims to the desecration of the A1 Aqua mosque in Jerusalem).

4. Ritual

a. Taking out of customary processions by the Hindus during Durga Puja, Ganapati
and other festivals, and by the Muslims on the occasion of Moharram ;

b. Disputes over the routes to be taken by the processions, the concept of traditional routes and the insistence by the Muslims that such processions should
not go through their localities;

c. Throwing of Gulal, coloured water and other coloured substances on the
Muslims in and around their places of worship during such processions; and

d. Raising of slogans by both communities on such occasions which are considered
provocative and abusive by the opposite community.

3.6 Dynamics of communal riots

A communal riot may start with an insignificant incident of eve teasing etc. but if the conditions are conducive it can soon flare up into wide-spread violence. Violence offers opportunities to the petty criminals to indulge in arson and looting. Anti-social elements stoke the fire and eventually even the sane community leaders who disparage the anti- social elements in normal times grudgingly accept them and even give sanction to their activities.

 

DISPUTE

CONFLICT

   

Rumours constitute another critical factor. With no inter-ethnic communication the communities accept whatever rumours they hear as truth. This is exploited by the anti- social elements or their political bosses on both sides. With utter breakdown of public order and wild rumours floating around communities become hysterical and take leave of their senses. Even law abiding citizens may actively take part in looting or at least in sheltering criminals and offering support.

3.7 Emerging Concerns

Growing urbanization, changes in organized sector employment profiles and the change in the political discourse of the country have clear impacts on riots situation.

3.7.1 Increasing Population Density

There has been a sharp rise in the slum population all across the country. Though not necessarily under the poverty line, life under such conditions involves misery and lack of civic amenities. This is likely to produce in them frustration–aggression syndrome facilitating ethnic violence.

CONFLICT

DIVIDES ORDINARY PEOPLE

DIVISION

SUSTAINS CONFLICT

Apart from slum dwellers, a large number of families occupy one room tenements. Historical prejudices lead to concentration of minority communities in distinct pockets and often to withdrawal and exclusivist tendency among their members. Given a city’s historical antecedents and economic and political situation, such demographical changes created the potential for communal mobilization. All over the world such tendencies draw the ire of the majority community.

3.7.2 Changing Profile in Organized Sector Employment

Employment in organised sector provides stable jobs. In the wake of economic liberalization, many established employers have shut down uneconomic manufacturing facilities and set up new facilities elsewhere driven by the economic incentives offered by those places. Though new employment opportunities have come up, these opportunities require a different skill set not usually possessed by the retrenched workers. This causes hardships to families and generates frustrations among unemployed and poorer sections. The informal sector, in such times, gains prominence as employer. Often employers in this sector have no legal existence and are not accountable to any one. The informal sector is lawless, cruel and harsh. It usually thrives on rank exploitation of workers., who have neither protection of any labour laws, nor any job security. Workers of this sector are likely to be among the first victims of communal aggression and, conversely, it is also probable that they are easily susceptible to be drawn into communal violence.

3.7.3 Changing Political Fabric: The political fabric has changed over the decades. The earlier themes of parliamentary democracy, respective merits of public versus private sectors have been replaced by a communal discourse. Originally confined to the mercantile communities and some forward caste, Hindutva has recently gained currency and fashionableness and its appeal now cuts across economic strata and caste divisions. Issues like terrorist incursions from Pakistan, and the alleged appeasement of Muslims for electoral gains have increasingly helped the acceptance of a militant form of Hindutva among the Hindus. The Muslims on their part have been driven more and more to assert their identity. This again has contributed to the Hindutva idiom gaining ground. Thus, over the years various social, political, economic and demographic factors have prepared the ground for more communal violence. Often the political factors aggravate the cleavages between the ethnic groups, functioning as proximate contributory cause for riots and violence.

3.8 Failures in handling communal riots

The factors encouraging communal violence are multiplying. It cannot be said that the police has been able to effectively handle the situation. The National Police Commission has identified a pattern in the failures of police to deal effectively with riot situations.

 Indiscriminate transfer, postings of officers
o Not always posted on objective considerations – officers are known to

hesitate in taking quick and firm decisions and rather seek directions from

higher quarters
o Officers not suitable for field postings have been known to develop

differences with colleagues – there is one reported incidence of a commissioner rebuking his DM in a police station and another of an SP being disowned by his sub-ordinates and accused of communal bias

o Posting at times are for too short tenures for adequate assessment of situation and to notice the minor incidents that precede communal subsequent tension

o In one riot case, “every one from the SHO onward in the police and the magistracy were new to the city and had little local knowledge.”

 Inadequate resources
o Many a time police forces get grossly out-numbered o At times the miscreants have superior fire power

 Unimaginative deployment
o Deployment without adequate briefing
o Dispersed in too small numbers to be an effective force o Not taking into account the vulnerable areas
o Not keeping sufficient reserve
o Frittering away the resources on unauthorized duties

 Inadequate training
o In one riot case “the force ran away from the scene and locked themselves

in the nearest building. In another incident the police force ran to the

police station and locked themselves there”.
o Junior functionaries of civil departments are often invested with

magisterial authority during riots. They rarely have full knowledge of law,

or of their powers, duties and responsibilities or any understanding of the

nature of communal riots
 General tendency to hide the true facts – lowering the casualty data has the

opposite effect, it gives rise to rumours and people start believing those rumours.

4.1 General

Chapter 4 Preventive Measures

Maintenance of law and order is perhaps the first duty, if not the raison d’etre, of State. Communal violence resembles a law and order problem but is far more insidious. First signs of communal trouble require the most stringent action to be taken because adopting lukewarm measures at the early stages often pushes the situation beyond a point of no return. Preventing a communal riot is far more important than containing it, because if violence is allowed to erupt it is difficult to suppress without counter-violence and without the attendant threat to lives and properties of law abiding citizens.

Analyses of past riots give us enough clues on what to expect and how to thwart communal violence. Existing laws of the land are mostly capable of dealing with communal situations. The standard procedures already in place are adequate for the administration to anticipate communal trouble in almost all cases for taking required measures. Riot scheme of riot plan forms the foundation of such procedures.

Senior functionaries in Home Department and Police Directorate have confirmed that all the districts in the State prepare District Riot Plans (DRP). DRP being a sensitive document can be shared only on need to know basis. Officials have confirmed that DRPs are comprehensive documents covering preparedness activities and response measures. DRPs, reportedly, contain full particulars of demography, existing disputes between communities, list of anti-social elements, opinion leaders, list of vulnerable locations, and also list of safe places where a population group, felt at risk, can be shifted temporarily. DRPs also have details of hospitals / other providers of medical facilities where wounded can be taken immediately. It is not known if DRPs provide for riot rehearsals i.e. mock drills or whether such drills are being carried out.

However, resources are understood to be woefully inadequate, and as described in the previous chapter, are often deployed unimaginatively and even frittered away on unauthorized duties. Institutional mechanisms for transfer, posting of officers and for

training of police and magistracy seem to have fallen into disuse (abuse). Thus, in spite of the procedural environment the culture of prevention and preparedness perhaps falls short for effectively managing a communal situation.

This being a State Disaster Management Plan, it should mainly concern with the strategic steps required from State headquarters for anticipating and countering communal violence. These steps necessarily entail reviewing what is done at the district level. That necessitates describing the district level procedures in some detail. The next few sections deal with the district level procedures, drawn largely from MHA Guideline on Communal Harmony and the report of the 6th National Police Commission. These are followed with the structural measures needed for giving the desired direction to counter communal violence.

It may be added that the “administrative problem of handling the communal riots cannot be separated from the general health of the administration, especially the health of the police force based on an objective policy of recruitment, promotions, postings and transfers etc.”

4.2 Agencies involved in managing a communal riot:

Police is the primary agency for communal situations. District administration, magistracy in particular, also has a key role in managing response operations. Other agencies that have major role in planning and execution of response operations are intelligence agencies, armed police (PAC) and army. For this Plan, all agencies other than police (i.e. even the magistracy) are support agencies. There are other support agencies viz. Department of Health, Department of Food & Civil Supplies, Directorate of Information & Public Relations (DIRP), and Department of Revenue (Scarcity), PHED and Fire Service.

Primary Agency’s (PA’s) role encompasses anticipation, preparedness, preventions, response and finally assistance in recovery. Support agency’s roles are varied. Intelligence plays a key role in anticipation, district administration (with police) in prevention, PAC and Army in response, Fire Service in rescue, Health in providing medical care to victims and responders and F&CS, PHED and Revenue (Scarcity) in relief and DIRP in managing the information environment.

4.3 Prevention

Prevention is better than cure. Prevention is least costly and most painless if it is achieved at the earliest stage. Many untoward developments can be detected merely by observing standard precautionary measures, many more by effective use of the intelligence gathering machineries. Precautionary measures and intelligence can prevent most of the proximate causes of riots. But in many cases the proximate cause can be spontaneous such as a quarrel between a tenant and a landlord of different communities or eve teasing. Even in such cases there is a lead time before violence erupts. Other preventive measures can make effective use of this lead time and stop the insignificant incidences from acquiring threatening proportions.

4.3.1 Precautionary measures
4.3.1.a Regulation: Precautionary measures essentially consist of regulation and restraint. Regulation measures are normal times procedures. The routine procedures of normal times such as a well dispersed police-presence in crowds, beat patrols, normal traffic control etc create a climate that helps in maintaining normalcy; and “normalcy always acts as an antidote to tension” and prevents the situation from growing beyond breaking point. State’s capability of protecting the citizens must be visible. If a citizen doubts it, he may seek protection elsewhere. Thus the strategy should be to strengthen police presence judiciously to inspire confidence in those who are afraid, and fear in those daring to challenge the law.

4.3.1.b Riot Scheme

A riot scheme details the course of action of the police in a riot situation. It is prepared during normal times. It contains various data relating to the area covered by it also deployment strategies to deal with a riot. Several riot schemes, reportedly, have been prepared in a routine manner without visualizing the different conditions that may emerge in a crisis. Many (most) schemes are said to be impracticable. Some of the reasons are:

b. They are designed for an isolated area, not taking into accounts the surroundings. Communal riots tend to spread quickly. Unless this factor is recognised a riot scheme may fail in its purpose.

c. Contemplated manpower is not worked out on a realistic basis.

While it may not be possible to conceive of a model riot scheme to cover all possible situations, the scheme should incorporate at least the following features:

a. Complete background information of the area covered by it

b. List of bad characters with their addresses and with the names of policemen who
will be able to identify them

c. List of locations where trouble could erupt, in order of their importance

d. More vulnerable localities where minority communities and weaker sections
normally reside in sizeable numbers

e. Maximum and minimum scheme of static deployment of the police.

f. Placement of reserves and the maximum and minimum reserves requirements

g. Information on hospitals, fire brigades, and availability of other civic services

The scheme should be carefully and constantly updated. Item (b) would require particular attention in this regard.

4.3.1.c Regulating vulnerable locations

DRP’s contain, rather start with, profiles of districts. The profile must identify areas prone to communal sensitivities and tensions and identify them as sensitive or hyper-sensitive. Each police station should systematically maintain the list of such locations in its jurisdiction and senior officials at the police station level should periodically visit them for promoting public contact with the population and meeting community leaders. Police Stations/Posts should be set up in all such sensitive/trouble-prone areas. Their manpower requirements should be realistically assessed and no vacancies should be allowed to remain unfulfilled. These stations / posts should be provided with trained personnel, adequate weaponry, communication links, vehicles, and equipment for videography.

District Administration should review the situation to anticipate possible developments in these sensitive areas, and prepare detailed Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and contingency plans to deal with them to preempt communal situation from turning violent.

4.3.1.d Preventive arrests: Other precautionary measure is restraining such elements as may be likely to create panic and confusion. This can be brought about by arresting those who are likely to indulge in acts against public order. But if applied indiscriminately, this measure can prove counterproductive. District Riot Plans (DRPs) invariably contain the

list of anti-social elements. But the records are not always current. Keeping this list up-to- date and correct is of critical importance. Equally important is that the police should be able to identify and arrest them when required. To ensure it, the policemen who would be able to identify these anti-social elements quickly must be on record.

This list must be prepared very carefully and reviewed regularly to ensure that law-abiding persons are not included. At many places such lists include names of petty criminals, this is of little value. The list should contain details of such persons who either by their own acts or by instigations can create insecurity amongst large sections of a community. There should be constant vigilance against such persons, even during normal times and on slightest hint of communal trouble the persons in this list should be taken into preventive custody. A person, whose antecedents warrant that he should be in the list and under preventive custody, is found participating in a riot, it can only mean either the police officers had prepared a defective list or they had failed to take action in time. The circumstances should be examined and those responsible for this should be punished.

4.3.1.e Peace Committees: Prevention does not stop with increasing police presence or with arresting anti-social elements. A developing situation can be defused by enlisting public cooperation. The role of Peace Committees in this regard has been stressed by several Commissions in the past. The committee should consist of important public men with considerable local influence, and who are acceptable to both the communities because of their proven impartiality. The administration should give these committees all assistance so that they can go round in the area and prevail upon the people to refrain from violent activities. In sensitive areas with a history of communal riots such peace committees should be constituted on a permanent basis and the membership of such committees should be constantly reviewed.

4.3.1.f Countering rumours and monitoring media: In a riot situation rumours are set afloat by interested parties. The administration should, therefore, disseminate correct and proper information to the public through all available means. Frequent broadcasts of correct and frank reports of the incidents occurring and of the steps taken by the administration boost the morale of the people and allay feelings of fear and insecurity in the population. Unless rumours are checked promptly and effectively the administration may loose the public’s trust and forfeit its cooperation. The emphasis should be on concrete steps taken for correcting the situation and not on authoritative demands on the people for cooperation. The

administration must establish its credibility, if it is to get public cooperation in tackling the situation

The law makes imputations, assertions etc., prejudicial to national integration a punishable offence. Still, very little action is taken by State Government and local administrations. Though freedom of the press must be upheld in a democracy, the Government must not allow mischievous reporting in the press to lead to a breach of peace. Legal provisions already exist for the control of prejudicial publications. The State Governments and local administrations need to act impartially and take all legal steps in this sensitive matter.

4.3.2 Intelligence

Clearly, intelligence plays the most crucial role in prevention of communal riots. In far too many cases post riot analyses have noted total lack of workable intelligence and have dubbed intelligence failure as one of the causes for eruption of violence.

Intelligence agencies operate both at State and district levels. There is a well established system of plainclothesmen gathering intelligence. Perhaps, more stress is required on intelligence gathering / data analysis by uniformed personnel. Many of the failures in the recent riots were largely due to the negligence of the uniformed staff to monitor intelligence.

At present the intelligence advices received from State level are often reported to be too general in nature to be of much practical use. Here too, it is seen that the old system has fallen in disuse. Police & administration have for long maintained records of various physical data. If updated regularly, a critical scrutiny of these records, particularly of the fluctuations therein, can reveal a number of pointers. Such records should be properly maintained by the police officers in-charge of the districts and police stations. Intelligence agencies at the district and the State level should look for significant data indicating an imbalance in any particular area. The district level agency should constantly feed the State level agency updated data relating to its district. The State level agency should interpret this data on an aggregate basis for the whole State. With such analysis, the advice of the State intelligence agencies to the district units would be more precise and useful and would enable the district administration and police to develop well chalked out plans in advance.

4.3.3 Control Room

A control room is an on-going facility available to the public for communicating with police authorities. Often the members of public are diffident about contacting the control room because they feel they would be subjected to annoying interrogation. A control room can have value in a riot situation only if it functions effectively during normal times. In addition to equipment, the persons in charge should be polite and competent enough to assess the information received. If control rooms inspire confidence in the public mind during normal times then they would receive a vast mass of valuable information during crisis situations. Control room should have an adequate team of well briefed police officers who can be expeditiously despatched to a scene of trouble and who can be expected to deal with it effectively. Briefing of these teams by senior officers in the control room is an extremely important exercise which should not be neglected.

4.4 Structural measures

4.4.1 Mock Drill: Riot schemes should be rehearsed from time to time so that those including the para military forces and the Army who have to implement them would know their roles during a crisis. National Police Commission has recommended the use of “sand model” exercises, which provide a clear view of the effect the concentration of force in one area may have upon the adjacent pockets. These exercises would give an idea of the pattern of mobilisation of forces, which would leave no gaps, and which would leave no community unprotected. They would also reveal the need of drawing alternative routes and sitting of reserves at easily accessible points that can be incorporated into the riot scheme. Such a scheme, properly exercised and updated, could be of great value during a real crisis situation.

Rehearsing the riot schemes needs to be a compulsory annual activity. This will of course demand time and financial resources but over all balance lies squarely in favour of the drills that would bring to fore the impracticalities and shortcomings, if any, in the schemes and would also institutionalize periodic updating of the scheme.

4.4.2 Operational Difficulty in Preventive Arrests

S 151 of CrPC authorizes a police officer to arrest a person without orders of a magistrate and without a warrant if the person is known to be designing to commit a cognizable

offence, if the commission of the offence cannot be otherwise prevented. This section is often invoked to arrest anti-social elements during riot situations. However, operational difficulty arises, particularly in a riot situation, because of the constitutional requirement that the person so arrested cannot be held in custody for a period exceeding 24 hours unless further detention is authorised under any other provisions law. An amendment to S151 of CrPC may be sought to enable the police to hold a person arrested as above for a period up to 15 days under orders from a Magistrate.

4.4.3 Transfer and Posting

The efficiency of Administration in handling communal situation cannot be separated from the general health of the administration. Reportedly officers are transferred and posted on political pressures. This shakes the faith of the people in the Administration and the police. Loss of credibility in the government has serious repercussions. As without active public cooperation, it is just not possible to control communal riots. Therefore, only specially selected experienced officers with an image of impartiality should be posted to the communally sensitive districts. They should not normally be transferred before the completion of their tenure and in any case all district and police officers should not be transferred at the same time. Sensitive district postings (or any field postings) should be given to only such officers who have displayed ability to read public behaviour correctly and who possess mature judgment.

4.4.4 Prosecution for violating curfew

Prosecution for violating a curfew is not easy under the existing law nor does it carry a deterrent punishment. This encourages anti social elements to break curfew with impunity. In many cases curfew seems to be a restriction only on laws abiding citizens while mischief mongers roam about freely. Structural measures are required to remedy it

4.4.5Hardships caused by curfews

Curfew causes considerable hardship to the common citizen because there is no special agency which can help them if they need to go out, for example, to the hospital. The beat policeman may not be of help because his mandate is to enforce the curfew and going away to the hospital may lead to miscreants coming out. There need to be explicit instructions regarding the procedure for obtaining curfew passes. These should be widely

publicised through radio and other media. There should be many centres, within easy reach of citizens from where these passes can be issued. Exceptions should be made in respect of people, going for medical assistance, going to railway station / bus stand to go out of station, or for some other urgent work. It is also important from riot management point of view as it would win over a majority of the citizens and enforcement of the curfew itself would become easier.

4.4.6 Registering offences during riots

Registration of offences is difficult in the chaotic situation that prevails during a riot. Victims would rarely risk their lives and go to the police station report a crime. Even if a crime is reported, the police in their preoccupation seldom register the reported offence. This practice must be corrected. A higher priority to restoration of order should not be done to the exclusion of other legal functions of the police. Police, therefore, should open several reporting centres at different points in a riot torn area, under the charge of competent officers instructed to record all crimes reported to them. The very fact that an aggrieved party is provided a facility to approach an agent of the law to report its grievance would increase its confidence in the rule of law, and will help towards restoring normalcy.

4.4.7 Investigations of offences reported during riots

Investigations of crimes cannot be undertaken during riots. Special investigation teams (SIT) should be set up to investigate crimes committed in the course of riots. Such teams should be set up under a State agency. SIT’s should consist of officers of high ability who could be expected to act without fear or prejudice. These teams should function under the supervision of a fairly senior officer.

Once a riot comes under control several forces try to interfere in the registration and investigation of crimes. Many influential people try to prevent initiation of action against anti-social elements. Non-initiation of action against such offenders destroys the trust of the local population and emboldens them (anti social elements) to act with more audacity in future. Investigations should be conducted competently, quickly and impartially.

Often a large number of cases related to crimes reported during riots end in final reports; convicted cases are usually simple cases in which the accused are caught red handed on the spot. In most of the complaints, the police are not successful in apprehending the

offenders. Finally, courts often take more than a year for disposal of these cases. Even setting up of special courts for expeditious trials, has not solved the problem. Perhaps some special provisions in the law and procedure are required in the investigation and prosecution of offences committed during communal riots.

4.4.8 Communal representation in Police

In many riot situations, police is said to have played a partisan role. It has been said that to make police fully representative of the society in which it functions, reservation of vacancies in the police should be made for minorities and other weaker sections, on the basis of their share in the population. It is also held by some that doing so would go against the basic police philosophy that the police as an organ of State have to function impartially and cannot have any caste or communal approach to a problem. Nevertheless, there is a strong case for encouraging the recruitment of members of the minority community and other weaker sections at various levels in the police force. Educational and other standards, however, must not be diluted for such recruitments. Any inhibition on the part of the authorities in recruiting members of the minority community in the police merely because they belong to a particular community should be strongly discouraged. Police force should truly represent the social structure but such a situation should be brought about by a competitive, fair, impartial recruitment and training process and not by a protective process like the reservation of vacancies.

4.4.9 Role of Home Guards

Home Guards are efficiently organised with proper command structure. Home Guards are generally local people and can play a useful role during riot situations. However, they need additional training and compensation when they are pressed into such difficult tasks. Availability and capability of Home Guards in districts should be fully made use of by the police. In an emergent situation the local authorities themselves should be empowered to requisition the services of Home Guards by framing appropriate rules for this purpose.

4.5 Training needs

 Policemen
o Combat training

o Weaponry
o Videography and communication o Motivational programmes

 Station o

o o o o

level police officers
Preparation of riot schemes Intelligence gathering
Force deployment and formation Weaponry
Motivational programmes

 Sub-division and District level police officers
o Preparation of riot schemes
o Intelligence analysis
o Force deployment and formation tactics o Motivational programmes

 Police Directorate Level
o Intelligence analysis

o Leadership
o Crisis management

 Junior Officers of other civil departments
o Special programme on riot control covering legal provisions, powers and

duties of a magistrate

 PAC
o Annual training for an entire company in one programme. o Search & rescue in collapsed structures

 Doctors / para-medics with Police / PAC o Emergency health management

5.1 Alert mechanism

Chapter 5 Response

In most cases the alert should come from the intelligence wing, unless communal tension builds up from spontaneous incidences such as eve teasing or stabbing. In such cases if beat patrolling is practiced the policeman on beat would be among the first to know. If the culture of communication between public and police is established through control room, the control room would be the first to know. However, at this stage the beat policeman or the control room in charge may not be able to fathom the communal overtones the incidence may acquire.

Such spontaneous acts lead to communal tension only if there exist seeds of discord in the society. The Station House Officer (SHO), with his well drawn riot scheme showing all potential trouble spot and constant surveillance of the area analysing the small incidences reported from there, should be in a position to foresee the coming communal tension. In any case full blown communal situation will not arise immediately. It takes time, albeit short, for a crowd to collect.

Districts

Threat discerned by

    

State / Central Intelligence Agencies

   

SCR

District Administration

  Closer regulation of vulnerable localities

  Closer monitoring of anti social
elements’ movements

  Informal meetings with members of
peace committees

  Strengthened, wide spread police
presence

Situation diffused

Violence flares up

 

Level declaration by SDMA

District Intelligence Agencies

Station House Officer

   

L1: Monitor the situation

L2: Activate SDMP

  

L3: Activate SDMP, Seek central assistance

 

Immediately the information must be passed on to the District administration, who in turn would inform the State Control Room in Lucknow. Thus the alert mechanism may entail information flow from State to district or from district to State. District will activate the warning phase of its DRP and keep SCR controlled. If the situation is not diffused and violence erupts, the SCR will define the level of the disaster keeping in view the report of the intelligence wing and of eh violence eruption(s). The chart depicts the flow of information and activities. In case of L1, SCR will merely monitor the situation. In case of L2/L3 the SDMP will be activated.

5.2 Criteria for level definition

If the violence and its ramifications can be brought under the control by the district administration, it is an L1 situation. If the scale of violence is such as would warrant intervention from the State level, it would be and L2 situation and in L3 situations Central government’s intervention becomes necessary. On threat perception, SCR will evaluate the situation based on inputs from the intelligence agencies and the district and apprise the SDMA. At the early stages level assessment exercise is necessarily prospective in nature.

In case the threat to communal harmony is caused by a stray spontaneous incidence the administration must be able to diffuse the situation by firm decisive action even while being alive to the sensibilities of the two communities. In other case, where threat is discerned from intelligence reports and some signs of tension are seen in one or more districts but no response is required from the State level it is still recommended that the situation be considered as the warning phase of L2 if more than one district report tension and of L1 if tension is reported by only one district.

Reports of large scale violence will almost always be accompanied with requests from district administration for units of PAC. Such situations, as they require State level interventions should be considered as L2.

5.3 Recommended measures

Required measures will depend on the level of the situation and have been described under different situations. Whereas L1/L2/L3 situations require response measures, L0 situations require normal times activities to be taken up with greater vigil. This being an SDMP, only State level activities/ measures are described in the following sections.

5.4 L0 Activities
5.4.1 Promoting communal harmony: Meetings of the State level Integration Committee, under the Chairmanship of the Chief Minister, may be held at least once in a quarter to review the communal situation in the State.

5.4.2 Intelligence: The old practice of data collection at police station (and even village) level, which has fallen into disuse should be revived and the State level intelligence agencies would collect details of physical data every month from all the districts. State level intelligence agency should interpret the data on a total basis for the whole State. They would look for significant fluctuations which would indicate an imbalance in any particular area. This way, the State intelligence agencies’ advices to the districts regarding the possibilities of tension in their respective areas would be more precise and workable.

5.4.3 Manpower planning: MHA Guidelines on Communal Harmony have reiterated many recommendations made earlier. In particular the following steps need to be taken on a continuous basis:

PA:

  All vacancies in police stations / districts in sensitive areas must be filled at all
times

  Composition of the armed police (PAC) battalions should reflect the population
mix of the State. It is all the more important as the impartiality of PAC has often
been questioned.

  Police forces- district police, district reserve police and PAC units- should be sent
for regular trainings. Training programmes must include sessions on motivation,
aimed at inculcating in them the spirit of secularism and communal harmony.

  Joint training programmes of State police forces may be explored with Army and / or para military forces to ensure better understanding of their respective roles and
stronger coordination during operations. SA: Health Directorate

 

 Medical relief teams should be constituted in such a manner that, as far as possible, members of various communities are represented in it.

5.4.4 Logistic planning

Logistics planning would largely consist of anticipating and fulfilling the required number and quality of weapon and adequacy of transport facilities. Transport needs would be for bringing in forces to the site of violence and also for removing casualties. Logistic planning would also consider ambulances, fire tenders, rescue equipment, tentage for persons who may be required to be displaced, food and other supplies including drinking water and sanitation facilities

PA:

  Increased use of firearms has been a recent trend in communal riots. Anti social
elements are now known to possess sophisticated weapons. Police headquarter should regularly review the weaponry of the sensitive police stations and districts to see if they match those expected from the miscreants.

  Wireless equipped vehicles are widely in use for patrolling duties. The number of such vehicles should keep pace with requirements – particularly for police stations in outskirts whose jurisdiction may not be fully covered with cellular phone network.

  Fire engines are critical equipment during riot management as riots are always marked with widespread arson. All district centres have fire brigades. Many congested towns (some with sensitive demographic profile) still do not have fire engines. Further, many high rise buildings are coming up in districts which challenge existing fire fighting capability. In light of this development the fire fighting ability needs to be augmented
SA-Department of Revenue (Scarcity)

 Many a time policemen combating riot situations receive grievous injuries and may

need to be shifted to larger hospitals at divisional headquarters or at Lucknow. Department of Revenue (Scarcity) which is also looking after Disaster Management may look into feasibility of acquiring helicopters earmarked for use during disaster management operations. (the financial aspects of this acquisition have not been considered in this Plan)

 

SA-Health Directorate

  A large number of ambulances are not properly equipped. A riot situation may
often demand cardiac care ambulances. Directorate to ensure that each district has at least two fully functional cardiac care ambulances. Directorate may even tie up with local private hospitals that may have better maintained ambulances for immediate availability during riots and such emergencies. If needed, this may be made one of the pre-conditions for grant of the license.

  Blood transfusion is most frequently required in riot situations. Directorate may enter into agreement with all the local blood banks for ensuring availability of blood during riot management – both for victims and for those engaged in managing riots.

  Special care may be required for the weak, aged, lactating mothers and pregnant ladies as also for treatment of shock and trauma. Directorate may make necessary arrangements based on the scenarios created in DRPs.
SA-Food & Civil Supplies

 People may need to be shifted from vulnerable sites during a riot situation till the

conditions calm down. These displaced persons may be forced to leave all their belongings, many of them may be small shop keepers and daily wage workers who would have no store of food. Food and other essentials will need to be supplied to them till normalcy returns and they can resume their livelihood. Department of Food & Civil Supplies may get into pre-purchase agreements for supply of food grains, tents, blankets, plastic sheets, and firewood etc with reputed suppliers for urgent purchases during riots

SA-PHED
 DRPs will have sites earmarked for relocating people from vulnerable areas. Such

sites may not have adequate sanitation facilities. Further, concentration of population will give rise to huge waste which will need proper disposal. It may well be beyond the capacities of the municipal authorities to arrange for sanitation and waste disposal. As the sites will be known beforehand from the DRPs, Department may make arrangements for such facilities, including water for drinking and sanitation purposes to be available when needed.

  

5.4.5 Contingency Planning & Drills:

PA

  PA may check the workability of riot plans by organisisng drills from time to time.
Since policemen are over-worked it is unlikely that drills will be taken up by districts unless closely followed up by PA. PA may send personnel from headquarters to ensure that the drills are taken in earnest and not merely for namesake. These drills must also include units of PAC and of Army so that all agencies get fully aware of their roles during a crisis. PA may maintain a record of the drills at different centres.

  Home Guard units may be deployed for many of the routine policing functions during riots so that more policemen are available for managing riots. This will require more frequent trainings of Home Guards in sensitive districts – which will in turn require resources. PA may consider getting approval at appropriate level for such trainings.

  In L2/L3 situation an initial meeting of the incident commanders and their staffs takes place immediately on establishment of the command structure. The purpose of this meeting is to seek consensus on priorities, tactical objectives, and an overall strategy to riot management. This meeting must be pre-planned as part of contingency planning for different degrees of riotous behaviour in different centres. Planning would entail strategic locations in each city that must be protected, (recovered from the mob), locations from where population must be shifted, typical requirement of striking forces to free the city from rioting mobs – different scenarios etc.
5.4.6 Monitoring developments and preparedness: MHA Guidelines on Communal Harmony recommend creation of a nodal cell, which would maintain a database on various communal incidents, details of the damage caused, lists of cases registered and progress of prosecution, etc. It would study the patterns of communal disturbances in the State and prepare appropriate preventive plans. It would also coordinate with other departments/agencies on issues relating to compensation, relief and rehabilitation, etc. The nodal cell would constantly review the communal situations in districts in the light of intelligence reports and would also monitor the observance of the standard preparatory

measures undertaken by the field staff. An illustrative checklist for monitoring preparedness measures follows:
PA

 Communal harmony measures
o Have all districts and all sensitive areas formed their Peace Committees?
o Is the membership of Peace Committees being reviewed to take into

account the changing social dynamics?
o Do the Peace Committees meet at desired frequency during normal times?

 District Riot Plan (DRP)
o Are the lists of anti-social elements being updated regularly? Does this list

also contain names of petty criminals?
o Does the DRP incorporate the names of the policemen who can identify

these elements when required?
o Does the DRP take into account the impact of communal situation in

neighbouring districts?
o Is the DRP based on the area wise riot schemes of different police stations

of the district?
o Is the man-power assessed realistically?
o Are all positions in sensitive districts / police stations fulfilled with no

vacant slot?
o Is the control room at the district adequately equipped?
o Do the sensitive police stations have videography equipment with trained

personnel?
o Does the district have adequate number of fire-tenders with trained

firemen?
o Does the DRP incorporate the details of deployment of force under

different scenarios with minimum and maximum reserve requirements?
o Have the district police tried out the DRP in a mock drill?
o Does the DRP mention the places where the PAC units will be housed

when called for assistance during a communal situation? (Often they are

housed in temples / dharmashalas that adds to their partisan image)  Armed police (PAC)

o Are the PAC personnel regularly undergoing their annual training programmes with an entire company together?

o Do the PAC units have adequate (and in working condition) tentage and other equipment?

o Do the PAC units have their own transport?  Preparing lists of suitable officers

o The Cell in consultation with the Home Deaprtment, maintain a list of such officers who have proven record of lawfully handling complex situations while in charge of districts. The list will contain officers from both administration and police wings. These officers should be known for firm decisive actions, and impartial conduct. In case of need State may decide to depute such officers to assist / guide / replace those in charge of the district.

o The Cell will also identify, in consultation with Home Department, senior officers who are capable of taking the position of Incident Commander in L2 / L3 situations.

5.5 L2 Responses

At State level responses would be strategic. It will essentially be monitoring the situation and making men and material available for operations.

5.5.1 Up-gradation of SCR to EOC and Command Structure

Immediately on declaration of L2 /L3 the State Control Room will be upgraded into Emergency Operation Centre and SDMA will appoint an Incident Commander. An L2/L3 level communal situation may often call for deployment of central government resources – army or para military forces units and this may require the incident command system to be expanded into a Unified Command (UC) structure as a UC brings together the “Incident Commanders” of all major organizations involved in managing the incident in order to coordinate an effective response.

Expansion of ICS into UC will depend on the extent of deployment of central resources. If 3 or more companies of Army are deployed it may be more efficient to go for a UC structure.

Whether a unified command is created or not, the essential command structure of EOC will remain the same, as depicted in the graphic.

SDMA

COMMAND STAFF Incident Commander / UC

Safety
Information

Liaison

Dir of Health PHED F&CS Electricity

 

Planning

Logistics

Finance & Administration

Intelligence

CRPF / Army

Deptt of Revenue (Scarcity)

Dir of Inf & PR

  

Operations

Tactical experts

5.5.2 Different Sections of the Command

IC/UC will have two types of staff, to borrow military phraseology, General Staff and Command Staff. General Staff Sections will be directly involved with containment of riot and restoration of order. Command Staff Sections will assist the IC/UC in other necessary functions. The General Staff Sections are:

  Operations Section: It is responsible for all operations directly applicable to the primary mission of containing the riot and restoring order. It will be headed by a tactical expert with in depth knowledge of the affected area who will direct the operations, once the action plan is approved by the IC/UC.

  Planning Section: It will be headed by a representative of State intelligence agency. This section is responsible for collecting, evaluating, and disseminating the tactical information related to the riot and subsequent developments. It will also prepare and document Action Plans for approval by IC/UC and after approval execution by the Operations Section.

  Logistics Section: It is responsible for providing facilities, services, and materials for the operations as envisaged in the action plan.

  Finance and Administrative Section: It is responsible for all financial, administrative, and cost analysis aspects of the management operation. It will be

Interlocutors Revenue (Scarcity)

   

headed by a representative of the Revenue (Scarcity) Department, which also looks after disaster management in the State.

The Command Staff is responsible for most effective use of the information environment, health and safety of people affected and of those engaged in response operations, and liaison activities. The sections are:

  Liaison Section: Liaison activities are of two types: first within command structure, among the various agencies involved this will be undertaken by a representative of the Revenue (Scarcity) Department. Other equally important liaison activity is establishing contacts with the opinion leaders of the two communities at State level. This is a highly skilled job and needs persons with credibility and contacts. Home Department will suggest the names of such interlocutor(s).

  Information Section: It will consist of representatives of the Directorate of Information and Public Relations. It will develop and release information about the riot management operations, indeed about everything related with the riots, to the news media as also to those engaged in operations. It will also arrange for media’s interface with incident commander or other senior decision makers in operations. It will also media visits if considered desirable. It will also monitor what media is reporting and wherever needed put forward the correct picture.

  Safety Section: It will be headed by a representative of the Directorate of Health and will have representatives of PHED, Food & Civil Supplies, Electricity and other such departments that may be of use in providing safety, security and relief to affected population. It will also recommend measures to the IC/UC for assuring personnel health and safety and to assess and/or anticipate hazardous and unsafe situations.
5.5.3 Major tasks of the Command

  Containment of communal trouble to the centres where it has already erupted

  Ensuring preventive measures at other vulnerable centres – particularly to those nearby centres that have close economic / social ties with the affected centre (a partial list is provided in Section 3.4.2 of this Plan), intelligence agencies would
give their assessment of threat potential at other centres

  

  Ensuring firm decisive action with overwhelming force to bring the situation under control as soon as possible

  Ensuring as much relief to citizens of affected area as is possible under the trying situation

  Initiating dialogues with influential opinion leaders of both communities at State level

  Keeping the media apprised of the development

  Galvanizing rescue and relief operations commensurate with the size of calamity
and extent / degree of human sufferings
5.5.4 Initial command meeting
The establishment of a command structure should immediately be followed by an initial meeting of the incident commanders and their staffs. During this meeting the incident commanders must come to consensus on priorities, a collective set of tactical objectives, and an overall strategy to carry out the response. This meeting may take too long unless it is pre-planned. The responsibilities discussed above should be pre-planned to the greatest extent possible. In this meeting the members may (must) share openly and honestly their priorities, considerations, and concerns. However, once they leave this meeting, they must speak with one voice.
5.5.4.1 Setting Priorities and Objectives
Different agencies will have different objectives to fulfill in riot management operations. However, some objectives would be common to all, in addition to their own set objectives. The common objectives are:

  Preserve the safety of human life;

  Stabilize the situation to prevent the event from worsening;

  Use all necessary containment tactics in a coordinated manner to ensure a timely,
effective response; and

  Address all three of these priorities concurrently.
Each Section will certainly have other significant priorities requiring consideration. Understanding all the issues is important because consensus must be reached for response to be effective.

5.5.4.2 Developing a collective set of tactical objectives

At the onset of the initial meeting, UC members have an obligation to raise and discuss honestly what each response organization can provide in terms of authorities, equipment, skills, and experience, including their response capabilities. All incident commanders (police, armed police, para-military forces and army) must be free to speak openly about their constraints or limitations, whether practical or political in nature, because these constraints may have an impact on how the objectives can best be achieved.

Each agency will bring its own set of objectives and considerations to the response, the UC must decide upon a collective set of objectives — to identify what needs to be accomplished — before an overall response strategy can be developed. To be effective, these objectives should be specific, measurable, assignable, reasonable, and time-related. The UC must come to consensus on a set of general objectives that can then provide focus for the response planning.

5.5.4.3 Adopting overall strategy

Strategy is the development of policies and plans to achieve the objectives. If the UC knows exactly how to accomplish an objective, it should specify the strategy. Because there are frequently multiple possible strategies that would accomplish the same objective, the Planning Section will recommend strategies for UC approval. This allows for better input and discussion from the responders, and also reduces meeting time for the incident commanders. The overall strategy will cover deployment of forces – both striking force and policing arms, tactical objectives and the time schedule for achieving those objectives, responders’ and affected population’s health and safety; and media management.

5.6 L3 Responses

In L3 situation the command structure and response mechanism shall remain the same as in L2, except that the UC may have a representative from MHA. L3 situations may have implications transcending state borders and many critical decisions may come from centre.

5.7 Schematic of the process flow

The process flow has been depicted under two situations:

a. Perception of threat to communal harmony – either by district intelligence or by State level intelligence agaencies

b. Flaring up of violence

5.7.1 Threat perceived by state level intelligence or by district level intelligence

1.

2.

Inform State Control Room

a. Decide about briefing DIPR to be ready to respond to if any news stories
that may appear in media at this stage

b. Decide about initiating talks with the community leaders

Inform district(s) concerned

a. b. c.

Closer regulation of areas prone to riots, closer vigil on vulnerable population – isolated residents in midst of the other community Locate the policemen who can identify the anti-social elements for preventive arrest on short notice

Monitor the movements of known anti-social elements

SCR

Initiate talks

Threat perceived

Alert PAC

District

         

Inform DIRP

  

5.7.2 Communal valence flares up

Closer regulation of areas prone to communal tension

Alert the policemen who can identify the anti social elements

 

Ready to respond to media reports

No action

Alert identified Incident Commanders

Close monitoring of movements of known anti social elements

 

Mobilize interlocutors

Communal riot flares up

SCR

    

Strategic support functions

SDMA declares L2

Control functions

 

1. Monitoring media & information dissemination: DIPR
2. Involving community leaders – SDMA level initiative – in consultation with incidence command

Assembling tactical experts

 

SCR elevated to EOC

       

Alerts:

Dep’t of Revenue (Scarcity);
PAC; Army; Dep’t of F&CS;

Dir of Health; DIPR; Power; Telecommunication

Creation of Command Structure

 

Situation assessment

  

Deciding on priorities

  

Finalisation of strategy

  

Resource mobilization

  

Support functions

Control Functions:

Is it an
L2 situation? SCR evaluates with Intelligence reports

 

 SCR gets elevated to EOC;
 Headed by pre-identified (alerted) Incident Commander;
 Other commanders from Army / PAC join in and command structure is created;  Command assesses the situation;
 Decides on priorities;
 Identifies objectives;
 Adopts a strategy to achieve objectives;
 Assesses the operational resources for the strategy; and

Assessment of reserve requirement Alert reserve forces / commanders

Indent resource requirements on Dir of Health and Dep’t of F & CS, Power and Telecommunications

1. Search & rescue- Fire services
2. Temporary shelter: Revenue (Scarcity), F&CS, PHED
3. Medical aid: Dir of Health, Voluntary agencies 4. Temp free kitchen: Revenue (Scarcity), Voluntary agencies
5. Essential services: Power, Telecommunication

 Mobilises resources

Strategic support functions:

Monitoring rumours and information dissemination – DIPR Involving the community leaders – SDMA level initiative

Support functions:

Search & rescue – Fire services
Medical aid – Health, Voluntary agencies
Temporary shelter – Revenue (Scarcity), Food & Civil Supplies, PHED Feeding the displaced persons – Revenue (Scarcity), Voluntary agencies Essential service: Power, Telecommunication

Chapter 6 Preparedness measures

6.1 Preparations for pre-determined responses

As mentioned earlier State level responses are strategic – deploying suitable commanders, enough men and adequate hardware. Performance of the deployed forces will be constantly monitored and tactical experts will be deputed to assist / guide or even replace the local commanders. The necessary normal time preparations for se have been detailed in Section 5.4 of the previous chapter.

6.1.1 Resource availability

PA may prepare the list of National and State resources that will be available during a riot situation. The resources may come from – government, private, and civil society: It is important to track the resources available from corporate sector during emergencies – these can range from vehicles, men trained in first aid, safe premises for sheltering vulnerable people from affected areas, hospital beds, pharmacies etc.

Inventory of human and material resources should be included in IDRN/SDRN and a system of quarterly stock taking and updating the database may be put in place. In particular the availability of the following at different centres;

 Tear gas
 Rubber bullets
 Water canons
 Snifter dogs
 Search and rescue teams
 Bomb diffusers
 Loud speakers
 Armed police force
 Communication equipment
 Videographic equipment
 Transport
 Tentage
 Civil supplies
 Drinking waters
 Ambulances
 Mobile hospitals
 Life saving drugs including intra venous drips
 Blood – plasma/ platelets
 Doctors / paramedics available with police / PAC units
 Doctors / paramedics available at Government hospitals in sensitive districts

Civil Society Organisations, particularly Red Cross can augment available resources. The details of resources available from them can be obtained from the Department of Revenue (Scarcity) who are the Primary Agency for ESF Donations.

6.1.2 Attending the special needs of the weaker sections- aged, lactating mothers, pregnant ladies etc- during communal situations
Sensitization programmes on the special needs of the weaker sections- aged, lactating mothers, pregnant ladies should be held for medial and para medical staff. While shifting populations from vulnerable areas to safer locations, these needs must be kept in consideration. In curfew bound areas, the system for passes for pregnant ladies going to hospitals must be streamlined.

State needs more women para-medics in every district.

6.2 Capacity building

Capacity building has many aspects:

  Training the manpower increases their fighting capacity and morale;

  Acquisition of proper equipment increases the capacity of the State to cope with
different situations; and

  Changes in legal environment increases the capacity of the regulatory framework
to deal with communal situations.
Training has been covered in Section 5.4.3. Equipment too has been covered in Section 5.4.4. The need for strengthening the regulatory environment particularly for post riot investigation into offences reported during the course of riots and prosecution of offenders have been referred to in Sections 4.3.6 and 4.3.7. Many offences committed during riots are not registered. Many of those registered are poorly investigated and not brought up for prosecution and finally prosecution takes years because of delays in courts. This emboldens anti social elements and also petty criminals in indulging in arson and looting during riots.
Any improvement in this area will go a long way in discouraging miscreants and will at least reduce the intensity of violence in riots if not eliminate the threat of riots. MHA guidelines suggest that all police stations in sensitive areas must have Videographic equipment. Policemen posted there must be trained in using the equipment for collecting

videographic evidences. And the institutional mechanisms for investigation and prosecution must be strengthened.

Often SITs are constituted to investigate into reported crimes, and many a time special courts are established for expeditious disposal of prosecutions. The results have been far short of expectations. SITs themselves have been accused, at times, of partisan behaviour and even special courts take too long to dispose cases. A more serious issue is withdrawal of many charges heets later under pressure from people wielding influence. There is a resolution by the National Integration Council against the withdrawal of such cases.

PA may examine how it can be put into practice – that a prosecution once launched in a court of law in respect of an offence committed in the course of a communal riot should not be withdrawn.

6.2.1 Incident Command System

This Plan envisages an ICS or UC structure for management of an L2 or L3 communal situation. Incident Command System is being used increasingly all over the world in order to professionalize emergency response management. This system provides for specialist incident command teams with an Incident Commander or a Unified Command with officers trained in different aspects of incident management – logistics, operations, planning, safety, media management etc. The LBSNAA Mussoorrie has been designated as the nodal training institution. At state level, UPAAM has been organizing programmes related with disaster management. Senior officers from police and administration should be exposed to such programmes at UPAAM or at LBSNAA.

6.2.2 Strengthening of Fire Services

Fire services play a major role in rescue operations in collapsed structures. Widespread arson is a common phenomenon during communal riots. Fire services’ capacity needs to be strengthened. They should be developed into multi hazard response units. Each fire station in sensitive areas should be provided with rescue tenders in addition to fire tenders. At larger centres such as Kanpur and Lucknow fire services should be provided with hazmat vans. There is a need for recruitment of more firemen as and intensive training should be given to them so that they can function as multi hazard response units.

6.3 Use of media

Powerful reach of media needs to be used more imaginatively during normal times to foster the feeling of communal harmony. There is a role for the Directorate of Information and Public Relations here. DIPR should prepare write ups on inspiring instances from the State’s rich history and lives of great evangelist religious leaders of the past, who had followers from booth communities and who are still held in reverence by both the communities. Such write ups should be regularly published through print media and programmes based on their lives may be aired by television channels.

Instead of inserting such write ups / programmes as paid adverts, DIPR can encourage writers / producers of repute and produce imaginative programmes with mass appeal that the established commercial media would be willing to participate in this endeavour.

7.1 Communities

Chapter 7
Partnership with Other Stakeholders

Partnering with communities entails not only maintaining contacts with the influential opinion leaders but institutionalising an arrangement whereby an ordinary community member – a man on the street – feels comfortable in coming up to authorities with his / her difficulties. Senior officers at district levels must find time to attend functions held by different forums of both the major communities. They may like to attend functions held at smaller, not fashionable schools where the students do not come from privileged backgrounds.

MHA Guidelines on Communal Harmony observe that “in a communally-sensitive area, small shopkeepers, entrepreneurs and daily-wagers are most prone to loss and damage to life and property, if the situation goes out of control, leading to arson or violence. They are most likely to face economic burden, due to loss of income or property, most of which is not covered under any type of insurance. They can thus be the most willing partners in maintaining peace and communal harmony in the area. Similarly, women who are the worst sufferers in such situations may also be keen to ensure communal harmony. The district administration can tap the resources and energy of these people/groups in ensuring peace”.

7.2 Academic institutions

Academic institutes often conduct research / studies in riots. Just as peace studies scholars began studying war in order to understand how to avoid it in the future, researches in riots may help us better understand their causes in order to devise ways of avoiding them in future. Researches with more rigour are required to understand how a city becomes riot- prone or another which was historically riot prone has become markedly less so – Meerut since 1987. The lessons learnt from such researches may explain how violent cities can be made peaceful.

Another important field of research is quantitative study in occurrence of riots – seeking the relationship between the known causative factors of riots and the probability of its occurrence at any centre. Such studies (not for communal riots) have been done assuming a linear relationship between the causative factors (they are assigned numerical values – based on their intensities) and occurrence of a riot. Linear regression models, so arrived, have some predictive ability. Primary Agency may consider commissioning such research with reputed institutes working in the field of public administration and/ or social behaviour.

7.3 Armed forces

Armed forces play a crucial role in all disasters by providing or augmenting the rescue and relief operations. In riots and civil disorder situations they often play the most important role in managing the situation. Partnering with armed forces does not require any special initiatives as they are state organs. But closer ties are required to get most from their involvement is riot management. Riot scheme rehearsals are the best way of achieving such ties. The drills will document the how best the tactical objectives and the command structure can be shared between police, armed police and armed forces.

7.4 NGOs

There are many voluntary organisations working in the field of promoting peace, national integration and communal harmony. Such organisations usually have committed and well- intentioned volunteers and workers. The district administration should maintain comprehensive data base on such organisations, and should mobilize support of, and encourage, such organisations, in their efforts to maintain communal harmony, and diffusing tension if a communal situation arises.

7.5 Public sector units and Private sector organizations

Large commercial organisation, whether in public sector or in private sector, have transport, hospitals, doctors, trained staff and protected space. On different occasions district administrations do seek their cooperation in managing situations. The resources available with all such units in a district / sub-division should be recorded. Relative strengths of the different units, where there are more than one, should be discussed in a

joint meeting in order to decide which unit will be expected to give what type of support to riot management operations. With their roles defined, the PSUs / PSOs may be asked to prepare their own standard procedures so as to minimise the response time.

Chapter 8 Financial arrangements

Disaster Management Act defines “mitigation” as “measures aimed at reducing the risk, impact or effects of a disaster or threatening disaster situation”. Obviously resources from Calamity Relief Fund (CRF) are not available for mitigation activities. It has, however, been provided that 10% of the annual inflows into the CRF can be used for the procurement of search and rescue (SAR) equipment and communication equipment. This provision can be utilized to acquire rescue tenders for fire services, to begin with, at sensitive centres.

HPC had recommended that at least 10 per cent of plan funds at the national, state and district levels be earmarked and apportioned for schemes which specifically address areas such as prevention, reduction, preparedness and mitigation of disasters. The Eleventh Finance Commission has paid detailed attention to the issue of disaster management and Disaster Mitigation Fund (DMF) is now a statutory requirement for all States. However there is no unanimity on what should constitute DMF. One approach is that it may comprise all Plan schemes which qualify as ‘mitigation’ under the Act. Another is that it may consist of a fixed percentage of total plan allocation to be spent only on such mitigation activities that are not covered under any of the existing plan scheme.

Planning Commission has suggested that 0.5% of the total plan allocation of each Ministry/ Department be earmarked for NDMF.

At present all capital expenditure on mitigation, except when covered under SAR equipment, will have to be met from plan funds. Primary agency should implement standard procedure of estimating riot mitigation expenditure in plan budgets.

PART III: CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

Chapter 9 Review and Updation

9.1 Schedule of riots drill and review of the Plan

PA may consider holding riot drills at all centres considered vulnerable in view of demography and past history. The following agencies shall participate in the drill:

 District police
 PAC
 Army
 Fire service
 Intelligence agencies  Health

 Civil supplies
 Power
 Telecommunication
 Red cross
 PSUs & Private Sector Organisations  NGOs active in communal harmony

The drills will take place after creating a detailed scenario, which will not be fully disclosed at the beginning. The scenario will be disclosed to participants in a phased manner, mimicking the way a real communal situation unfolds. Objectives of the drill would be to assess:

 At command level:
o Time taken for activation of SDMP
o Time taken for creation of a the command structure
o Time taken for agreeing on the common tactical objectives
o Time taken for finalising the strategy to achieve the tactical objectives

 At field level
o Immediate availability of forces with the district police
o Immediate availability of physical resources for operations – tear gas,

water canons, rubber bullets, arms & ammunitions,
o Characteristics of force deployment by district police
o Time taken for arrival of reinforcements from PAC and / or Army
o Characteristics of force deployment under UC
o Availability of doctors, paramedics, life saving drugs, secured places

where vulnerable population can be shifted,
o Availability of volunteers from NGOs and time taken for their

reporting

PA may consider undertaking three / four drills every years so that the following centres are covered at least once in two years:

Aligarh, Azamgarh, Bulandshahr, Chandausi, Kanpur, Meerut, Moradabad, Varanasi, Saharanpur,
The Plan should be reviewed after each drill

9.2 Action Taken Reports and Review of this Plan

Once the Plan is approved, to determine preparedness level the PA and the SAs will need to take some actions or confirm that no particular actions are required and they are capable of discharging all responsibilities arising from this Plan.

The purpose a review is to determine at regular intervals whether the planning documents continue to be adequate. The need for review arises from changes in the environment for which the document is prepared. A structured arrangement for review expedites the plan review process. This Section contains the procedure for ensuring that the agencies named herein are prepared and for expediting the review process.

The Department of Revenue (Scarcity) (DRS) is in charge of disaster management. Therefore it may need to coordinate the approval / review process. DRS may like to ensure that concerned agencies determine whether the issues related to them are adequately addressed on a continuing basis by reviewing the relevant parts (related to them).

DRS may also like use the issues that are not addressed in the document, i.e. such issues which are noted as requiring structural measures, as institutional goals to be achieved. Once they are achieved, the resultant measures are incorporated in this document in future.

9.2.1 Approval & Review Process

Once approved, the Plan must provide proof that the Head of DRS or the officer in charge of disaster management, has approved the document with a dated signature page, every second year or whenever the incumbency changes.

 Head of the PA or an officer made in charge of managing this disaster must put his signature in proof of the approval of the document every two years or whenever the incumbency changes.

  Head of Home Department or any officer made in charge of this disaster, must confirm that officers for taking over as Incident Commander and tactical experts are being identified and groomed on a continuous basis with the location where the current list of such officers is maintained, every two years or whenever the incumbency changes.

  The Head of PAC or an officer delegated by him for this purpose must confirm every year that the annual training programmes (of one company at full strength at one time) are being conducted regularly.

  The Head of Fire Services or an officer delegated for this purpose must confirm every two year on the as multi-hazard rescue training of firemen.

  Health Director or an officer delegated for this purpose must confirm that the list of hospitals, available doctors, paramedics , life saving medicines etc are updated for every sensitive centre every year.
9.3 Mainstreaming DM concerns with Development Plans
A number of mandi towns do not have fire service. All towns in sensitive zones need well equipped fire brigades. This will require- building, equipment and trained firemen. District administration may encourage such small towns to explore:
 Getting the building constructed on the outskirts by entering into an agreement with nearby Panchayat under NREGA.
 Buying equipment with funds from CRF, as mentioned in the previous chapter 10% of the annual inflows into the CRF can be used for the procurement of search and rescue (SAR) equipment and communication equipment.

 Training local youth to work as volunteers under district disaster management initiatives by contacting the District Coordinator. Such volunteers will assist a core team that must be appointed by State Fire Service for each such centre.

ANNEXURE I Questionnaire given to the Home Department, Government of UP

1. What are the various factors or undercurrents that heighten the probability of communal disturbances or riots?

2. Do riots have any correlation with trade or economic cycle?

3. What measures can lead to stability other than routine measures of arrest, curfew and peace committee meetings?

4. Is police impartial in its handling of riots?

5. What can be done to change the orientation of the police force?

6. Are riots spontaneous or borne out of conspiracy?

7. Why do rumours spread? Why do some rumours take longer to die?

8. Can we say with some degree of assurance about the types of people who take part in riots – who actually take part in riotous activities, who finance such active elements, who encourage their fervour and who help cool frayed tempers?

9. Development of a situation in a riot is understandably a complex process rife with vendetta and other such “balancing acts”. Under such circumstances can we identify actual perpetrators of riots?

10. To what extent the administration can prevent riots from taking place?

11. Is there any action plan aimed at preventing riots in the State?

12. How necessary it is for the State to resort to violence to counter communal violence?

13. Is tactful handling of a situation at variance with its lawful handling?

14. History of Communal riots in U.P.? Is there any city / district wise record?????

15. Has the State Government / Home Department undertaken Vulnerability Assessment on Communal Riots? Is there any such system in place??

16. Does the Home Department have a Graded list of Communally Sensitive Districts in the State? Is it reviewed and updated periodically?

17. If yes, what is Grading Methodology for vulnerability of Districts exposed to Communal Riots? Does it include tangible factors / and impending causes for grading the vulnerability of respective cities/ districts?

18. Are there any new Towns / districts added to this list (other than that have long history of communal rioting)? What is the basis?

19. Is there any official analysis of:

a. Categories of Communal riots in the state

b. Classification of causes leading to Communal riots

c. Occasions / situations that flare up communal tension

d. Factors that increase the vulnerability

e. Socio-economic & religious profile of persons instigating / participating in Riots

20. Are SOPs in place for:

a. Prevention & Peace time pro-activity

b. Preparedness

c. Early Warning and Response mechanism

d. Damage Control

e. Recover and rehabilitation

f. Post Riot promotion of Communal harmony

21. Lessons learnt from 92’ riots?

22. Best Practices in preventing and controlling Communal Riots?

23. Major administrative “failures” in assessing / preventing and controlling communal riots?

24. External forces contributing to communal tension? How can they be controlled?

25. Is it failure of intelligence or administrative failure to response to intelligence reports?

26. Unresolved issues (location wise) in the state that can fuel Communal Tension?

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